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Contract Creep
TAL KASTNER* & ETHAN J. LEIB**

Scholars and judges think they can address the multiple purposes and
values of contract law by developing different doctrinal regimes for different transaction types. They think if we develop one track of contract
doctrine for sophisticated parties and another for consumers, we can
build a better world of contract: protecting private ordering for sophisticated parties and protecting consumers’ needs all at once. Given the
growing enthusiasm for laying down these separate tracks and developing their infrastructures, this Article brings a necessary reality check to
this endeavor by highlighting for scholars and judges how doctrine in
contract law functions in fact: it creeps back and forth from track to
track. Bespoke contract law ends up as general contract law, and law
designed for one contract ecosystem will almost invariably migrate to a
different transactional environment. Thus, contract doctrine will be
applied in a context for which it is not suited, where it may actually
undermine stated doctrinal goals.
This Article identifies “creep” from sophisticated party doctrine into
consumer contract law and from consumer contexts into sophisticated
party transactions through a few case studies. It then elaborates the mechanisms by which creep occurs: porous definitions of transaction types;
contract drafting practices of standardization with portable provisions
that confuse courts; and good old common law analogical reasoning that
involves law jumping from track to track. We conclude by instructing
judges to be more mindful of the process of contract creep, warning contract drafters to better appreciate the risks and costs of their drafting practices, and exhorting contract theorists to include the risks and costs of
creep as they develop their doctrinal edifices, which are likely to be
applied off-track.
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INTRODUCTION
Courts hearing contract cases sometimes act like they can have at least two different contract law regimes: one for “sophisticated parties” and one for “consumer
contracts.”1 Much scholarship, reflecting a variety of methodological approaches,
embraces the idea of a fragmented or otherwise tracked system of contract law to
facilitate its multiple purposes and values.2 Different types of transactions
1. See, e.g., Meredith R. Miller, Contract Law, Party Sophistication and the New Formalism, 75 MO.
L. REV. 493, 501–18 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, Formalism] (discussing this dichotomy in contract law
disputes); Meredith R. Miller, Party Sophistication and Value Pluralism in Contract, 29 TOURO L. REV.
659, 671–72 (2013) [hereinafter Miller, Value Pluralism] (same); Andrea Doneff, Arbitration Clauses in
Contracts of Adhesion Trap “Sophisticated Parties” Too, 2010 J. DISP. RESOL. 235, 251–57 (2010)
(same); see also Oppenheimer & Co. v. Oppenheim, Appel, Dixon & Co., 660 N.E.2d 415, 421 (N.Y.
1995); Reilley v. Richards, 632 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ohio 1994); Crane, A.G. v. 206 W. 41st St. Hotel
Assocs., 87 A.D. 3d 174, 180 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011); Interpharm, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.
08 Civ. 11365(RJH), 2010 WL 1257300, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010); Davis & Assocs. v. Health
Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 168 F. Supp. 2d 109, 113–14 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
2. See, e.g., HANOCH DAGAN & MICHAEL HELLER, THE CHOICE THEORY OF CONTRACTS 8 (2017);
Daniel Markovits, Contract and Collaboration, 113 YALE L.J. 1417, 1419–20 (2004); Alan Schwartz &
Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 618 (2003); see
also ERIN A. O’HARA & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE LAW MARKET 8 (2009) (noting the need to
“distinguish business-to-business from business-to-consumer contracts” in analyzing choice-of-law
policy); Robert E. Scott, The Promise and the Peril of Relational Contract Theory, in REVISITING THE
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privilege distinct contractual goals, such as collaboration, relationship building,
personal autonomy, community, or efficiency. And these different goals—or sets
of goals with different priorities—should prompt distinct doctrinal approaches.
Thus, a tracked or fragmented contract law system that offers a different doctrinal
regime for each transaction type ideally enables sophisticated parties to engage in
private ordering, on the one hand, and might protect consumers subject to power
imbalances that implicate their free choice, on the other. The wisdom of having
different doctrinal tracks for different transaction types has become widely
accepted in current scholarship and by judges.3
However, we argue here that judges and scholars tend to overlook how contract
doctrines that are developed in one track creep into another and, in doing so,
threaten to undermine the goals of distinctive tracks. Courts and scholars too often fail to address the tendency for contract rules developed for sophisticated
party transactions to migrate into contract law for consumer transactions, and for
consumer contract regimes to bleed into the contract law for sophisticated transactions. Along the same lines, even within broad transaction types, bespoke principles developed in light of specialized areas are susceptible to creeping beyond
the particular transaction type for which they were designed, potentially compromising the integrity and goals of the tracked system. This blurring of the boundaries between contract regimes cuts at the heart of a premise of a broad swath of
contract theory. Unstable boundaries threaten the viability of developing distinct
packages of contract law to pursue different objectives for different kinds of parties with the aim of facilitating efficiency4 and autonomy5 in varied transactional
contexts.6
This Article traces a few examples of what we call “creep,” to draw more attention to the porous boundaries of the contract law for “sophisticated parties” and
CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL 107 (Jean
Braucher, John Kidwell & William C. Whitford eds., 2013); Ronald J. Gilson, Charles F. Sabel &
Robert E. Scott, Text and Context: Contract Interpretation as Contract Design, 100 CORNELL L. REV.
23, 42 (2014) (critiquing the “presumption of the unitary nature of contract law” in light of the
variegated nature of contract practice); Ethan J. Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and
Conciliation in the General Theory of Contract, 24 QLR 1 (2005).
3. See, e.g., 29 Holding Corp. v. Diaz, 775 N.Y.S.2d 807, 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004) (“It is almost
axiomatic that commercial leases may and should be governed by a different rule than residential
leases.”); DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 2, at xii (“[E]xisting contract law still offers types that vary
widely in their normative structures . . . .”); Gilson et al., supra note 2, at 76 (advocating distinct
interpretive approaches for different transaction types); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 543
(referencing the “heterogeneity of contractual contexts” prompting a range of normative approaches).
4. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 544–45 (offering a normative theory of “business
contracts” to “facilitate the efforts of contracting parties to maximize the joint gains (the ‘contractual
surplus’) from transactions”).
5. This agenda is most apparent in Dagan and Heller’s so-called “choice theory” in DAGAN &
HELLER, supra note 2, at 6–7. Dagan and Heller not only base their goal of facilitating autonomy on the
possibility of identifying distinct contractual types in practice, but also consider the cultivation of
distinct types an essential means to enable parties to exercise autonomy.
6. Doctrinal boundary-drawing has also been identified as a challenge with respect to contract
generally. See Jay M. Feinman, The Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 STAN. L. REV. 661 (1989)
(analyzing the question of doctrinal classification on the boundaries of contract and tort law).
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the contract law for “consumers.” In doing so, we examine the even-more-unstable
distinctions within those classifications and on the spectrum between them. We
also aim to identify some of the mechanisms by which creep occurs both in our
case studies and more generally. We argue that judges, lawmakers, drafters, and
contract theorists need to be more sensitive to the way creep works so that their
approaches do not rely on naı̈ve hopes about the containment of doctrinal elaborations or on misplaced confidence that boilerplate terms will not be cut and pasted
across transaction types. As we will show, doctrine that looks bespoke for one contractual context often ends up as general contract law—and terms built for specialized transaction types can also jump off track and into less appropriate
transactional environments. As we outline, there are various factors that challenge
the project of doctrinal containment, including intentional doctrinal expansion by
courts and lawmakers (to say nothing of possible ideological manipulations), and
accidental or incidental application of particularized doctrine to a different transactional context.
Part of the trouble—at least with respect to the most basic two-track model
between sophisticated parties and consumers—certainly is that judges and contract theorists need to do a better job of fashioning ways to identify “sophisticated
parties” and “consumers,” for these are not self-defining categories: When a contract law professor signs up for a gym membership, is the professor a consumer
or a sophisticated party?7 When someone uses social media to promote her work
with a great deal of computer savvy, is the individual a sophisticated party or a
mere consumer?8 We are not the first to notice the difficulty that the project of
defining these categories poses, but we intervene to identify the significance of
creep as a fundamental challenge to much of contract practice and theory. If these
categories are used to trigger distinctive interpretive and doctrinal regimes, we
will need to find better tools to map their boundaries and signal on-ramps onto
the varied tracks.9

7. Some courts strongly enforce a “duty to read” against attorneys. See Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513
F. Supp. 2d 229, 241 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (enforcing Google’s form contract against an attorney, in part
because attorneys can be deemed sophisticated, even though there was no evidence that the attorney had
any expertise about the kind of contract at issue). Others take a more case-by-case approach, evaluating
whether the lawyer has relevant expertise to qualify as “sophisticated.” See Reilley v. Richards, 632
N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ohio 1994) (finding that an attorney with no knowledge of real estate law could not be
treated as a sophisticated party).
8. A recent case disposed of this question by noting the degree of sophistication of the consumer
parties and accordingly holding them bound to the terms and conditions. See Salameno v. Gogo Inc., No.
16-CV-0487, 2016 WL 4005783, at *6 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2016) (suggesting a frequent flier’s “apparent
need for internet access” reasonably qualifies her as sophisticated “internet user” for purposes of
determining her ability to access terms of use to establish notice and consent); see also Fteja v.
Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“But it is not too much to expect that an
internet user whose social networking was so prolific that losing Facebook access allegedly caused him
mental anguish would understand that the hyperlinked phrase ‘Terms of Use’ is really a sign that says
‘Click Here for Terms of Use.’”).
9. See, e.g., Miller, Formalism, supra note 1, at 518–35 (arguing that courts need to try harder to
determine sophistication as a matter of fact to trigger special rules for sophisticated parties);
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But as we show here, blurry specification of party type and transaction type by
courts and scholars is only one structural cause or mechanism of creep. Another
traces to drafting realities that gravitate toward standardization and portability of
clauses.10 The migrating nature of contractual terms from one contract type to
another creates some difficulty for regime integrity. With migration of terms
comes messiness about whether interpretations developed in one transaction type
deserve to be implemented in new transactions in which parties or drafters think
they can pluck modules off the rack. Moreover, technological and transactional
innovation also has the potential to make more difficult the identification of doctrinal boundaries. Not only do technologies of contract drafting—such as the ability to cut and paste and to share models widely blur the bounds of context—but
parties innovate in creating new deal structures and documentation that may
include models from various sources. Yet, whether parties and drafters always
intend to incorporate the doctrinal gloss that the words provoke in a different
transactional context can be difficult to assess. As a result, innovation on various
dimensions of contract practice can disturb doctrinal boundaries based on transaction type. Technologies of legal research can exacerbate the problem: whereas
treatises, key numbers, or a library’s physical layout once may have helped lawyers, clerks, and judges focus on important context, the current availability of
models ripped from context makes it harder to keep doctrinal regimes on track.
Analogical reasoning in the common law of contract is no doubt also a culprit,
creating mistaken off-ramps from track to track and continuing to push toward
uniformity among contract law regimes. Of course, analogical reasoning can also
be a generative source of innovation within contract law development—so we do
not come to devalue the cross-fertilization of different tracks, which can lead to
overall improvements in doctrine.11 But those who promote distinct tracks need
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 cmt. e (AM. LAW. INST. 1981) (acknowledging that the
rules for standardized contracts do not perfectly work for the class of “sophisticated consumers” who
will get the benefit of restrictive readings of form contracts that they may not really deserve under the
Restatement’s rule); Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 545 (confronting the doctrinal “boundary issue”
between sophisticated and consumer party contract law); Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False
Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 312–13 (2005) (arguing that the category
of “small businesses” renders the boundaries imperfectly drawn between consumers and merchants in
contract and commercial law). In another context, Melvin Eisenberg argues that relational contract law
never fully developed as a separate contract regime largely because it has never been clear how to divide
the world of relational contracts from the world of discrete transactions. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Why
There Is No Law of Relational Contracts, 94 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 805, 813 (2000) (“[I]t is impossible to
locate . . . a definition that adequately distinguishes relational and nonrelational contracts in a legally
operational way—that is, in a way that carves out a set of special and well-specified relational contracts
for treatment under a body of special and well-specified rules.”).
10. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, in
BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 163, 165 (Omri Ben-Shahar ed., 2007)
(highlighting the portability of provisions related to recurring contractual issues).
11. Two examples come to mind. First, consider the way the Uniform Commercial Code’s (UCC)
Articles 1 and 2—governing specialized contract law for the sale of goods—have gravitational pull on
the common law of contract applicable to contracts outside of the coverage of the UCC, see Peter A.
Alces & Chris Byrne, Is it Time for the Restatement of Contracts, Fourth?, 11 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 195, 195
(2009); Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 737, 738–39
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more critical awareness of the risks of creep so they can understand the interaction effects among the different laws of contract.
Judges, legislatures, lawyers, and scholars must confront creep because failing
to do so means they are overlooking a powerful dynamic that can create unintended consequences in purportedly different domains of contract law. They must
account not only for a potential blurring of lines between contract regimes, but
also for the migration of doctrine from one regime to another, to which it might
not be well-suited. Because of the damage that creeping doctrine can wreak on
the goals and effective functioning of different doctrinal ecosystems, the risk of
invasive species within delineated areas of contract must be taken more seriously
as a meaningful cost associated with a fragmented contract law. This cost must be
considered even if there are also countervailing benefits that can accrue from the
experimentation of trying old clauses and interpretations and rules in new environments.12 Creep is not always bad, nor is it always good, but we need to
acknowledge it is happening in order to sharpen our cost–benefit analysis, limit
its impact when it is inappropriate, and celebrate it when it is usefully innovative
in the way the common law can be at its best.
The Article proceeds as follows: In Part I, we explore how several theorists
and judges have embraced the idea of a tracked and fragmented contract law. In
Part II, we develop a few case studies of the phenomenon of “creep,” demonstrating that creep goes both ways. In our case study of the enforceability of arbitrations clauses, for example, we are able to show how creep from “sophisticated
party” transactions ended up as general contract law applied to consumers. By
contrast, in our case study of contra proferentem—the rule that requires construction of ambiguous contracts against the drafter—we show how creep can work in
the other direction, too: seemingly tailored rules for one transactional context to
help consumers end up applied to sophisticated parties in very different contractual environments.13 In Part III, we explore three mechanisms, or features, of contract law and its practice that enable creep: category instability concerning both
(2000), and vice-versa. Courts and scholars acknowledge that different contract law applies to sales of
goods and sales of services, but there is clearly mutual learning back and forth among the regimes. One
might say creep here is more or less expected of the common law method, even with the statutory
character of the UCC, and that this creep might be a productive source of illumination and innovation.
Similarly, some of the innovations of “relational contract law” have been largely incorporated into the
general law of contract in part because boundaries between “relational” contracts and “general”
contracts are hard to spot and in part because the innovations for relational contracts—good faith and the
relaxation of offer-and-acceptance rules, for example—are thought to be good for contract law more
generally. See Eisenberg, supra note 9, at 818–19.
12. Our discussion of creep and the UCC might be said to be examples of when cross-fertilization
can lead to net benefits. See supra note 11. Yet there is no excuse for failing to acknowledge and
evaluate the costs of widespread cross-fertilization as well. And although further work might usefully
spell out when someone might be able to know in advance when the benefits will outweigh the costs, we
aim here to draw attention mostly to the costs, so they are not overlooked in the relevant calculus.
13. Although contra proferentem historically operated as a kind of general contract law before
becoming more focused as a specialized rule for insurance law, its modern valence and justification are
most clearly explicated in consumer cases. See generally Joanna McCunn, Contra Proferentem: The
Chameleon of Contract Law (forthcoming 2019) (tracing the history of the doctrine in the common law).
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party type and transaction type; the modular design of contract documents and
the portability of terms; and analogical reasoning as a mainstay of the common
law. We also show how this non-exhaustive collection of features of contract that
precipitate creep often operate in tandem with one another to exacerbate the blurring of doctrinal regimes. Finally, Part IV is our effort to draw some lessons from
contract creep. In short, we think lawmakers, lawyers, and scholars need to be
mindful of the way creep works, so that if they want to continue to have a fragmented contract law, they will need clearer criteria for entry into each track and
better cost–benefit analysis to evaluate how law built for one environment can
undermine the goals of others. One cannot just will away creep—and lawmakers
and scholars need to better consider the kinds of downstream unintended costs
and risks specialized rule design might cause once it creeps off track.
I. THE FRAGMENTED MODEL
Explicitly or implicitly, contract scholarship and caselaw reflect a conventional
understanding that not all transactions are the same nor should they be treated
that way. It is not news that consumer transactions do not look like “fully negotiated contracts of the classical model.”14 And it is not exactly a new recognition or
development in contract law that consumer protection has been somewhat parceled off from general contract law to better calibrate rules and standards to those
who, “as a group, . . . have a lower level of sophistication than those with whom
they typically make contracts.”15 Although there has long been a countermovement toward reviving benchmarks of “party autonomy” even within consumer
transactions, reinforcing the need for consumers to take responsibility for their
choices in the market,16 a more recent and concerted effort by law-and-economicsinfluenced contract theorists seeks to concede the distinctiveness of consumer transactions and focus their energy instead on purifying contract law to make it safe and
efficient primarily for “sophisticated parties.”
The work of Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott is an exemplar of this focus on
building and reinforcing a law for sophisticated firms. From the very start of their
project of orienting contract law and theory toward facilitating parties’ ability to
maximize joint gains from transactions, they explicitly limit their framework to
circumstances in which “a firm sells to another firm,” where firms are “sophisticated economic actors.”17 Although they do not deny that individual–individual
and individual–firm contracts are controlled in part by contract law, they emphasize family law, real property law, consumer protection law, employment law,

14. William J. Woodward, Jr., “Sale” of Law and Forum and the Widening Gulf Between
“Consumer” and “Nonconsumer” Contracts in the UCC, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 243, 244 (1997).
15. Id. Woodward dates these developments to the 1930s, and the acceleration of consumer
protection law to the 1960s. Id.
16. See id. at 245–46.
17. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 544–45. Schwartz and Scott define sophisticated parties
relatively broadly to include corporate entities with at least five employees, limited partnerships, and
professional partnerships “such as a law or accounting firm.” Id. at 545.
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and securities law as the primary sources of regulation for these kinds of transactions.18 If pressed, it is hard to believe they would not call the relevant transactions that are not between firms “contracts.” Still, they want “the main subject of
what is commonly called contract law” to be focused on a law for sophisticated
parties.19 Indeed, they reinforce the importance of their goal for contract law by
emphasizing that their doctrinal reform proposals and normative assessments are
limited only to the “contract type” they put at the center of their work: contracts
between sophisticated parties, who can “minimize the likelihood of systematic
cognitive error.”20 They want a “law merchant for our time,” worrying that “rules
that are appropriate for contracts involving individuals . . . are too frequently
applied to sophisticated parties.”21 Vic Goldberg’s recent book on contract law
also focuses especially on a law for sophisticated parties.22
Even scholars who resist a narrow perspective on contract law limited to sophisticated party transactions also implicitly acknowledge the importance of
differentiating doctrinal tracks. In a recently published book, Hanoch Dagan
and Michael Heller criticize what they see as an effort to “radically shrink[] the
scope of contract law” to focus principally on sophisticated parties.23 They aim
for a “general theory of contract” that can incorporate both the relevance of
utility to sophisticated parties24— and the relevance of what they call “community” in other contract types.25 To their credit, they want the theory and law of
contract to be more capacious and accommodate more contract types: the
ambition of the theory is to do a little more “lumping.” Yet their efforts are
similar enough to other “splitters” because at the center of their perspective on
contract is the need to have differentiated types that parties can select among:
they are eager to furnish “the ability to choose from among a sufficient range
of off-the-shelf, normatively attractive contract types,”26 and some quantum of
“intra-sphere multiplicity.”27
For Dagan and Heller, this leads to a fragmented set of tracks for contract law
itself, while simultaneously being more ambitious about the scope of contract:
“the application of familiar contract concepts . . . should vary depending on the
normative concerns driving different contract types.”28 Thus, by bringing, for
example, employment relations and consumer transactions back into the frame of
18. See id. at 544.
19. See id.
20. Id. at 545–46.
21. Id. at 550.
22. See VICTOR P. GOLDBERG, RETHINKING CONTRACT LAW AND CONTRACT DESIGN 1 (2015) (“My
concern, I must emphasize, is with the contracts of sophisticated parties.”). Goldberg defines
sophisticated party transactions as “agreements for which both parties could be expected to have access
to counsel.” Id.
23. See DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 2, at 56.
24. Id. at 57.
25. See id. at 58–64.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id. at 6.
28. Id. at 7.
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contract law, Dagan and Heller at the same time emphasize that separate rules
within contract law are necessary to pay respect to context.29 They are not only
interested in a “two-track model” per se,30 but they return often to a distinction
between “consumer transactions” and “commercial contracts,”31 with the categories of “relative sophistication” and “consumer” still doing some meaningful
work in marking contract types and the legal regimes that ought to apply to
them.32 Indeed, their conceptual framework depends on distinguishing among
contractual contexts, and the line between consumer and commercial is ostensibly among the easiest to discern.
Not only does this fragmented approach make sense in terms of theorizing contract law—as contract law theories have often struggled to reconcile the plural
values at stake within contract such as autonomy, efficiency, community, reciprocity, and fairness—but it also resonates in terms of how judges at times
approach doctrinal rules. There are subtle hints within several doctrinal developments indicating that courts are edging closer to developing separate bodies of
law—or at least separate applications to the body of rules—for sophisticated parties on the one hand and consumers on the other, as well as between or within
these categories. The lack of consistency here causes plenty of confusion,33 and
scholars are right to remind courts that they probably should be sensitive to different values in different contractual contexts. But the law already implicitly
acknowledges a fragmented model in some respects.
Consider, for example, the parol evidence rule, which works to exclude certain
forms of extrinsic evidence when interpreting the text of a final written agreement.34 There is a lot of debate about how best to implement the rule—and how
to understand courts’ seeming inability to apply the rule consistently and coherently.35 On the one hand, there is an approach that uses the rule aggressively to
hew to the text of the agreement. It seeks to exclude as much as possible, with the
hope that a strong rule incentivizes better drafted final agreements and helps
29. Id. at 70–72.
30. For various ways of divvying up the different tracks, see DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 2, at 96,
99.
31. Id. at 73. Dagan and Heller make a mistake here in calling consumer transactions a “nocommunity” type. See generally Ethan J. Leib, What Is the Relational Theory of Consumer Form
Contract?, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE EMPIRICAL
AND THE LYRICAL 259 (Jean Braucher, John Kidwell & William C. Whitford eds., 2013) (describing
ways consumers have significant ongoing relationships with form contract providers).
32. DAGAN & HELLER, supra note 2, at 98–99.
33. See Ethan J. Leib & Zev J. Eigen, Consumer Form Contracting in the Age of Mechanical
Reproduction: The Unread and the Undead, 2017 UNIV. ILL. L. REV. 65, 67–68.
34. See generally John D. Calamari & Joseph M. Perillo, A Plea for a Uniform Parole Evidence Rule
and Principles of Contract Interpretation, 42 IND. L.J. 333 (1967).
35. See Scott J. Burnham, The Parol Evidence Rule: Don’t Be Afraid of the Dark, 55 MONT. L. REV.
93, 95, 98 (1994); David R. Dow, The Confused State of the Parol Evidence Rule in Texas, 35 S. TEX. L.
REV. 457 (1994); Gregory Klass, Parol Evidence Rules and the Mechanics of Choice, 20 THEORETICAL
INQ. L. (forthcoming 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3150616; Marie Adornetto Monahan,
The Disagreement over Agreements: The Conflict in Illinois Regarding the Parol Evidence Rule and
Contract Interpretation, 27 S. ILL. U. L.J. 687 (2003).
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courts avoid motivated testimony.36 On the other, there is a more intentionalist
approach that pursues what the parties really intended given the context. This
approach admits more extrinsic evidence, with the hope that a less strict rule will
reduce errors and work against the potential power imbalances that could bias the
language in the final text of the agreement and bias courts toward presuming the
final writing is actually integrated.37 Most courts, however, appear somewhat
inconsistent as to whether they apply a “Willistonian” hard rule or a “Corbinite”
softer rule.38
Yet taking account of the status of the parties—specifically whether they are
sophisticated parties—makes this “dark” rule “full[] of subtle difficulties”39 take
slightly more coherent shape. There is evidence that courts are more likely to
adopt a harder parol evidence rule when they have sophisticated parties before
them and a more liberal parol evidence rule when they do not.40 Although courts
are not necessarily always explicit or intentional about this two-track parol evidence rule, a fragmented doctrine helps to explain case results that are otherwise
practically inconsistent.41
At times, however, courts make more deliberate efforts to pick a doctrinal rule
to privilege a certain transaction type. For instance, New York42 explicitly
adopted a strict parol evidence rule, precisely because it sought to orient its law to
“promote and preserve New York’s status as a commercial center and to maintain
predictability for” sophisticated parties in their contract and commercial law.43 In
some ways, New York tries—imperfectly but self-consciously at times—to create the very “law merchant for our time” for which Schwartz and Scott advocate.44 This is at least some evidence that contract law sometimes takes itself to
provide specialized legal regimes for sophisticated parties. Moreover, the
American Law Institute’s effort to create a new Restatement for consumer
36. 4 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 633 (Walter H. E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1961).
37. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 573–95 (rev. ed. 1960).
38. See Calamari & Perillo, supra note 34, at 343–44. Some states are more consistent than others—
but even within relatively consistent states there is variation.
39. JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COMMON LAW 390 (1898).
40. See Robert Childres & Stephen J. Spitz, Status in the Law of Contract, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7–8,
17 (1972); Michael A. Lawrence, The Parol Evidence Rule in Wisconsin: Status in the Law of Contract,
Revisited, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 1071, 1072.
41. See Childres & Spitz, supra note 40, at 7–8, 17; Lawrence, supra note 40, at 1072.
42. See W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, 77 N.Y.2d 157, 162 (N.Y. 1990).
43. IRB-Brasil Resseguros v. Inepar Invs., 20 N.Y.3d 310, 315–16 (N.Y. 2012). For some of the
historical evidence that New York has been pursuing this goal, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE LEGALIST
REFORMATION: LAW, POLITICS, AND IDEOLOGY IN NEW YORK, 1920–1980, at 80–92 (2001). See also
Jody S. Kraus & Robert E. Scott, Contract Design and the Structure of Contractual Intent, 84 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1023, 1046–48 (2009) (identifying formal doctrines of contract interpretation such as the parol
evidence rule and the plain meaning rule as a way to give parties control of the court’s process of
interpretation and meaning of terms, respectively).
44. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 550. See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P.
Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in
Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (2009); Geoffrey P. Miller, Bargains
Bicoastal: New Light on Contract Theory, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475 (2010); Geoffrey P. Miller &
Theodore Eisenberg, The Market for Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2073 (2009).
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contracts45 involves the articulation of a specialized legal regime for consumer
transactions. Notably, that draft highlights that a softer parol evidence rule should
apply when a court is evaluating whether a consumer form contract is integrated
and thus whether to bar supplemental terms.46
***
This Part sought to introduce the idea of a fragmented or tracked framework of
contract law, showing how courts and scholars have tried to parcel the doctrinal
regimes of contract into, at least, a contract law for sophisticated parties and a
contract law for consumers. But what if the multi-track model routinely breaks
down in practice? What if regimes set up for one contract type routinely “creep”
into other contract types? With porous boundaries, is there any real hope for
clean, severable contract regimes which we can select among? If regimes are
hard to differentiate, these tracking projects might be more challenging than often
presumed, notwithstanding their intuitive appeal. Part II below offers a few case
studies of what we are calling “contract creep.”
II. CREEP STUDIES
Against the backdrop of the attempted fragmentation of contract law in theory
and in practice outlined in Part I, this Part presents a few examples of creep
between transaction types. As the examples demonstrate, doctrinal creep happens
as courts allow rules contoured for one transactional context to migrate to another
context for which they are ill-suited.
In our first example (section II.A), ancillary terms such as arbitration and forum selection provisions proliferate across transaction types, with courts treating
them more or less uniformly, notwithstanding that such provisions impact the
value of transactions for different parties differently.47 Courts take a relatively
uniform approach notwithstanding empirical evidence and judicial and scholarly
recognition of the distinctive ways that these types of ancillary terms operate in
different transactional contexts.48 Moving in the opposite direction, in our second
example (section II.B), the widespread application of the interpretive principle of
contra proferentem—the principle of construing contracts against their drafter—
demonstrates creep from insurance law to general contract law. As such, a principle that emerged from a recognition of a distinct transaction type involving qualitatively differently situated parties has crept into courts’ approaches to contract
interpretation in general. What these case studies have in common is that

45. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW CONSUMER CONTRACTS (AM. LAW INST., Discussion Draft 2017).
46. Id. § 8 reporters’ notes, at 93–96 (discussing case law supporting a “probative and not
conclusive” rebuttable presumption of integration in consumer contracts with a merger clause).
47. See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 403 (2d Cir. 2004); Fteja v. Facebook, Inc.,
841 F. Supp. 829, 835 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
48. See Gilson et al., supra note 2, at 76 (“acknowledging that commercial and consumer contracts
are different and should be interpreted differently”).
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specialized and fragmented contract law veers off-track into general contract law.
The urge to harmonize in the face of fragmentary design seems remarkably
powerful.
A. CREEPING FROM THE LAW OF SOPHISTICATED PARTIES INTO GENERAL CONTRACT
LAW

Ancillary contract terms typically govern secondary aspects of a deal rather
than the primary transactional details such as product, service, quantity, and
price. Often, ancillary terms are relegated to the margins of a contract and can be
embedded as boilerplate or standardized provisions. Notwithstanding their secondary role and their relative inconspicuousness for some, ancillary terms can
impact transactions in significant ways. Indeed, they can serve as valuable tools
for sophisticated parties to shape their agreements. At the same time, they may
prove particularly challenging for individual consumers to assess. Below, we
offer case studies of two types of ancillary terms: arbitration provisions, which establish that parties agree to submit all or certain disputes to arbitration rather than
judicial review,49 and forum selection provisions, which designate the court and
location in which disputes arising out of the agreement must be litigated.50
As these terms proliferate across transaction types, courts tend to treat them
uniformly, notwithstanding the distinctive ways in which they reflect parties’
goals and intentions in different transactional contexts. The discussion that follows traces the doctrinal treatment of these provisions to illustrate the ways in
which the doctrine creeps from sophisticated party and commercial contexts into
consumer contexts in which the rationale and treatment in the commercial context proves inapposite.
1. Arbitration Clauses
The proliferation of arbitration provisions in recent years has been well documented.51 The prevalence of arbitration provisions has in turn prompted concern
from scholars and journalists because of the risk that the enforcement of these
terms might derogate from average consumers’ ability to hold companies

49. Domke on Commercial Arbitration describes arbitration as “a process by which parties
voluntarily refer their disputes to an impartial third person (an arbitrator) selected by them for a decision
based on the evidence and arguments to be presented before the arbitration tribunal.” 1 DOMKE ON
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION § 1:1 (Larry E. Edmonson ed., 3d ed. 2009).
50. See 17A AM. JUR. 2D CONTRACTS § 253 (2018) (“A ‘forum selection’ provision in a contract
designates a particular state or court as the jurisdiction in which the parties will litigate disputes arising
out of the contract and their contractual relationship.”).
51. See, e.g., Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the
Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK (Nov. 1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/
dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-system.html [https://nyti.ms/1kkstih] (identifying
arbitration in the consumer context as prone to the leveraging of power by repeat players); Jessica SilverGreenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALBOOK (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitrationeverywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://nyti.ms/1KMvBJg].
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accountable for misbehavior.52 Below, we briefly recount the trajectory of the
enforceability of these provisions from a presumption against enforceability in
the early twentieth century to legislative intervention establishing enforceability
to the increasingly expansive presumption of enforceability in jurisprudence of
late.
Prior to the enactment in 1925 of what is now known as the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA),53 arbitration provisions had limited impact in practice.54 A reaction to
federal courts’ resistance to arbitration provisions,55 the FAA altered what was
viewed as an anachronistic presumption against enforceability.56 It did so by providing that written arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract.”57 The legislative history of the FAA indicates an intent to intervene in merchant-to-merchant transactions,58 a transaction-type perspective that
52. See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 51; see also Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of
Liability: The Forthcoming, Near-Total Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373,
393–95 (2005); J. Maria Glover, Note, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1740–42 (2006); Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether
Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1136–37 (2006) (tracing the rise of binding pre-dispute arbitration
clauses in private contracts). A rich collection of scholarship has identified the harms and offers
critiques of the presumptive enforceability of proliferating arbitration terms across transaction type. See,
e.g., NANCY S. KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 121–22 (2013); MARGARET
JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013); Judith
Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the
Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2870–71 (2015). The scholarship has not, however, identified
the enforceability of arbitration provisions as a piece of a larger story about the phenomenon of doctrinal
creep.
53. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (originally enacted as the United States Arbitration
Act, ch. 213, § 1, 43 Stat. 883 (1925)).
54. See S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924) (describing written arbitration agreements as “in large part
ineffectual” as of 1924); see also David Horton, Arbitration About Arbitration, 70 STAN. L. REV. 363,
377–99 (2018) (relaying the initially modest ambitions, structure, and increasingly broad interpretation
of the FAA, including with respect to “arbitration about arbitration”).
55. See Keith N. Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis,
8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 209, 215 & n.14 (2000) (citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S.
20, 24 (1991)).
56. See H.R. REP. NO. 96, at 1 (1924) (“Arbitration agreements are purely matters of contract . . . .”).
57. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
58. See Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal Commercial
Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
67th Cong. 9 (1923) (statement of Mr. W.H.H. Piatt, attorney, Piatt & Marks) (asserting that the FAA
was not intended to “be an act referring to labor disputes, at all. It is purely an act to give the merchants
the right or the privilege of sitting down and agreeing with each other as to what their damages are, if
they want to do it”); see also J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law,
124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3060 (2015) (explaining that FAA’s legislative history “indicates that the bill’s
supporters likely . . . intend[ed] for it to cover . . . negotiated agreements between merchants”); David S.
Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an
Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 38 (asserting that in light of the legislative text and
history, FAA was “not intended to apply to adhesive pre-dispute agreements”); Jean R. Sternlight,
Compelling Arbitration of Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866: What Congress Could Not Have
Intended, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 273, 310–13 (1999) [hereinafter Sternlight, Compelling] (outlining FAA’s
legislative history to indicate Congress’s focus on allowing “business entities to agree voluntarily to
arbitrate . . . commercial disputes between them” with a concern that arbitration not be imposed via non-
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can be seen in the Supreme Court’s approach to the FAA for a time. In the decades following the enactment of the FAA, the Supreme Court viewed the statute
with an eye to the distinctions between types of parties. The Court noted parties’
relative bargaining positions59 and suggested that arbitration provisions would
not be enforced in adhesive consumer or employment contracts.60
More recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, however, has erased this doctrinal
distinction.61 This, in turn, has encouraged the proliferation of arbitration provisions across transaction types, which implicate bargaining power in markedly distinctive ways depending on the relative sophistication of parties.62 A rich
literature has illuminated the failure of contract doctrine to account for ways in
which individual parties to contract fall prey to cognitive errors.63 As many scholars have observed, ancillary terms such as arbitration provisions present especially significant cognitive challenges for individual consumers, straining
consumers’ ability to meaningfully assess the terms’ values and implications.64
One assessment of rampant arbitration provisions put it this way: “under most
reasonable definitions mandatory arbitration is nonconsensual, given that consumers and employees don’t typically read or understand the clauses.”65
Arbitration provisions, unbeknownst to most consumers, threaten to deprive individuals of opportunities for redress from harm under the contract (whether it
sounds in breach of contract or tort),66 as well as protections of federal statutory
negotiable insurance or employment contracts of adhesion); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory
Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (2005) [hereinafter Sternlight, Creeping] (noting
concern in legislative history that arbitration would be “offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis to captive
customers or employees,” and reassurances by supporters of the legislation that it was not intended to
apply in such cases).
59. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435 (1953) (“While a buyer and seller of securities, under
some circumstances, may deal at arm’s length on equal terms, it is clear that the Securities Act was
drafted with an eye to the disadvantages under which buyers labor.”).
60. See Glover, supra note 58, at 3060 & nn.31–33 (citing Wilko, 346 U.S. at 433–35, 437–38). As
Glover notes, the Supreme Court was reluctant to enforce arbitration agreements that impacted federal
statutory rights. Id. at 3060.
61. See Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 58, at 1637–38 (outlining Supreme Court’s post-Wilko
course reversal beginning in the last decades of the twentieth century).
62. See id. at 1631 (noting increasing use of arbitration provisions by U.S. companies in light of
approval by the Supreme Court).
63. See, e.g., Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 211 (1995); Russell Korobkin, The Status Quo Bias and Contract Default Rules, 83 CORNELL L.
REV. 608 (1998).
64. See Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 258; Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1217, 1225–27 (2003). For a summary of
the challenges posed by arbitration provisions for individual consumers, see Tal Kastner, “I’m Just
Some Guy”: Positing and Leveraging Legal Subjectivities in Consumer Contracts and the Global
Market, 23 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 531, 537–38 (2016). See also Sternlight, Creeping, supra note
58, at 1648–52 (summarizing evidence of consumers’ limited contractual literacy and noting design
tactics by companies to shift consumers’ focus, as well as repeat player and more subtle advantages that
accrue to companies through mandating arbitration with consumers and employees).
65. Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 58, at 1649.
66. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344, 352 (2011) (holding FAA preempts
state law prohibiting contractual restriction of class-wide arbitration); see also id. at 365 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (indicating the potential implications of enforcement terms by outlining how a contractual
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rights.67 More generally, the inability of consumers to weigh such provisions suggests a market failure in the consumer context.68 In this light, many scholars argue
for distinctive interpretive approaches to such terms rather than allowing the presumption of enforceability to bleed from the law of sophisticated parties into
other contexts.69
Yet, notwithstanding the difference in parties’ abilities to assess meaningfully
and negotiate arbitration provisions and in the related differential impact of arbitration provisions across contractual contexts, Supreme Court jurisprudence has
moved away from distinguishing on the basis of transaction type. In this case,
creep has been driven from the top down, beginning with the Court upholding a
“liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” in the form of the FAA.70
Thereafter, the Court enforced arbitration provisions against consumers bringing
antitrust claims,71 investors making securities laws claims,72 and employees
claiming violations of federal anti-discrimination statutes.73 It then expanded the
FAA to presume all claims arbitrable unless Congress expressly provides otherwise.74 These developments have contributed to the proliferation of arbitration
provisions in transactions across contract types.75
Recently, one judge marveled at the incongruous application of the FAA to
online consumer contracts, not least because of the nature of the transaction. Here

restriction on class actions precludes the pursuit of meritorious claims); RADIN, supra note 52, at 5–8,
33–34 (describing firms’ “mass-market boilerplate” as “withdraw[ing] a number of important recipients’
rights—such as rights of redress granted by the state, or user rights that are free of owner control under
intellectual property regimes”).
67. Glover, supra note 58, at 3061.
68. Behavioral economics scholarship has identified the “imperfectly rational” response of
consumers to contracts and the ways drafters of consumer contracts mobilize contract design to
capitalize on consumer psychology. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 2 (2012)
(identifying a market failure that results from contract design); see also Yannis Bakos, Florencia
Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to
Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2014) (identifying a systemic failure of consumers to
read end-user license agreement terms resulting from high reading and comprehension costs); David A.
Hoffman, From Promise to Form: How Contracting Online Changes Consumers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1595, 1640–42 (2016) (discussing how firms can shape individuals’ understanding of the meaning of
their contracts contrary to their legal import).
69. See, e.g., Gilson et. al, supra note 2, at 76 (“[W]e propose separating consumer contracts from the
standard common law rules of interpretation designed for commercial parties by first acknowledging
that commercial and consumer contracts are different and should be interpreted differently.”).
70. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).
71. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628–29 (1985).
72. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481, 486 (1989).
73. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 29, 35 (1991).
74. See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 565 U.S. 95, 98–101 (2012).
75. Glover, supra note 58, at 3061; Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 58, at 1631. As Glover notes,
arbitration agreements need not be signed to be enforceable, enabling the proliferation of terms through
a range of written forms. Glover, supra note 58, at 3061 n.39. Parties may become bound to arbitration
provisions by smartphone software applications (apps) that provide notice of agreement generally along
with access to terms. See Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2017).
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is Judge Jed Rakoff on a mandatory arbitration provision linked via an app in a
case involving a putative class action against Uber alleging illegal price fixing by
the platform:
Since the late eighteenth century, the Constitution of the United States and
the constitutions or laws of the several states have guaranteed U.S. citizens the
right to a jury trial. This most precious and fundamental right can be waived
only if the waiver is knowing and voluntary, with the courts “indulg[ing] every
reasonable presumption against waiver.” . . . But in the world of the Internet,
ordinary consumers are deemed to have regularly waived this right, and,
indeed, to have given up their access to the courts altogether, because they supposedly agreed to lengthy “terms and conditions” that they had no realistic
power to negotiate or contest and often were not even aware of.
This legal fiction is . . . justified . . . by reference to the “liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration” . . . . Application of this policy to the Internet is
said to inhere in the Federal Arbitration Act, as if the Congress that enacted
that Act in 1925 remotely contemplated the vicissitudes of the World Wide
Web. Nevertheless, in this brave new world, consumers are routinely forced
to . . . submit . . . to arbitration, on the theory that they have voluntarily
agreed to do so in response to endless, turgid, often impenetrable sets of
terms and conditions, to which, by pressing a button, they have indicated
their agreement. 76

Judge Rakoff here identifies the distinct landscape of consumer contracting in
which the presumptive enforceability of such provisions operates differently than
the paradigmatic “voluntary agreement” of sophisticated parties, upon which the
pre-internet FAA focused.

76. Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408, 410–11 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), vacated sub nom. Meyer v.
Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66 (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Granting a motion by
Airbnb to compel arbitration of a claim of racial discrimination on behalf of a class, district Judge
Cooper acknowledged the distinct consumer context and its impact on parties formally agreeing to
such terms:
All of us who have signed up for an online service recently will recall the experience.
After entering the service provider’s website, we were presented with a “sign up” or “create
account” button prominently displayed on the screen. Next to the button—less prominent,
no doubt—was the ubiquitous advisory that, by signing up, we would be accepting the provider’s “terms of service.” Perhaps there was a separate check-box prompting us to indicate
our agreement to those terms. Regardless, eager to begin using the service and realizing that
the provider’s contractual terms are non-negotiable, most of us signed up without bothering
to click the accompanying link to reveal the contractual terms. Those who did undoubtedly
found numerous pages of legalese. The intrepid few who actually read all the terms almost
certainly learned that one of them requires users to relinquish their right to have a jury
resolve any dispute with the provider. And that another bars class actions. This experience
[is] shared by countless people each day.
Selden v. Airbnb, Inc., No. 16-CV-00933 (CRC), 2016 WL 6476934, at *1 (D.D.C. Nov. 1, 2016).
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2. Forum Selection Clauses
Forum selection clauses—contractual provisions that designate the court and
location in which disputes arising out of an agreement will be litigated77—aim to
establish personal jurisdiction and venue to minimize costs and uncertainty.78 In
particular, by including a forum selection provision, parties may limit costs by
contractually protecting against litigation in a distant forum, as well as limit the
costs of uncertainty about where claims will be brought.79 Contractual designation of forum also enables parties to anticipate litigation costs and negotiate terms
accordingly.80 In this way, a forum selection provision operates as a discrete but
sophisticated tool to choose favorable legal regimes and allocate and mitigate
future costs.81 Underlying current receptivity to the enforceability of forum selection clauses is a presumption of the parties’ ability to choose. Thus, the nature of
the implications of forum choice,82 and the trend toward its acceptance precipitated by the demands of international transactions, indicate its divergent operation across transactional contexts.
Enforceability of these clauses emerged historically in connection with the
question of the rights of corporate entities. As courts appreciated the value to parties of voluntarily establishing personal jurisdiction and venue, they grew comfortable with this kind of forum shopping.83 But this appreciation in the first

77. See supra note 50.
78. See David H. Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 TEMP. L. REV.
785, 785 (1993) (describing the forum selection clause as a tool “allowing a party to limit its expenses of
defending a lawsuit in a distant forum” by “determining in advance where litigation should take place”).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 70 (describing some of the useful purposes of including
a “choice-of-court” provision). For an analysis and critique of the interpretive rules applied to forum
selection clauses framed in terms of data concerning “contracts between and among business entities,”
see John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Boilerplate Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. (forthcoming
2019).
82. The argument that a competitive market protects consumers from opportunistic behavior by the
drafter–seller may be inapposite in the case of forum selection provisions. The current lack of salience
of the terms for consumers and consumers’ lack of understanding of the implications of forum selection
provisions, in tandem with the operation of forum selection in limiting venues for redress, make it
unlikely that competition and reputational concerns will limit sellers’ enforcement of the term. See
O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 136; see also Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided
Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827, 834 (2006) (demonstrating the
incentives for businesses to waive enforcement for reputational ends with the example of a hotel checkout rule).
83. See Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451–53 (1874) (voiding an agreement by an outof-state corporation to forgo removal to federal court in recognition of a corporation’s rights as a
citizen). The historical treatment of forum selection provisions as counter to public policy originally
stemmed from the view that they inappropriately served to “close the access to” courts of their
jurisdiction, “divest courts of their established jurisdictions,” and deprive a party of substantial rights.
Id. at 451–53 (“A man may not barter away his life or his freedom, or his substantial rights [or] bind
himself in advance by an agreement, which may be specifically enforced, thus to forfeit his rights at all
times and on all occasions, whenever the case may be presented. . . . [T]he principles mentioned . . .
show that agreements in advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and
void.”). By the 1970s, the Supreme Court dismissed the policy concern of “‘oust[ing]’ a court of
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instance involved sophisticated parties; the potential impact on parties who lack
the sophistication to assess the value, costs, and implications of such terms
remained troubling to courts for a time.
Notwithstanding some state law exceptions to the prevailing rule of presumptive enforceability,84 forum selection provisions have become commonplace.
They appear in contracts such as asset purchase agreements,85 credit agreements,86 and Google’s terms of service87—and can have significant implications
for parties, both in terms of cost savings as well as issues related to access to justice and redress.88 They operate as sophisticated cost-mitigating provisions that
also implicate significant substantive rights in ways that are difficult to assess,
and which may not be evident to an untrained eye.89 As with arbitration provisions, the extent to which forum selection provisions reflect the intentions of the
parties depends on the type of contract in which the terms appear. Because of the
potentially significant implications of a forum selection provision, some argue for
different default rules and interpretations in differing transactional contexts.90
The history of the doctrinal acceptance of forum selection offers one more
example of the phenomenon of creep from similarly situated negotiating parties
to general contract law. Against the backdrop of a long-held presumption against
jurisdiction” as a “vestigial legal fiction” that predates the operation of businesses in world markets. The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 12 (1972).
84. Some states statutorily void certain forum selection provisions. See Nat’l Auto Lenders, Inc. v.
SysLOCATE, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1322–23 (S.D. Fla. 2010), aff’d, 433 Fed. Appx. 842 (11th
Cir. 2011); Digital Envoy, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 2d 1377, 1381 (N.D. Ga. 2004). Others treat
them as non-binding but consider them a factor in determining the exercise of jurisdiction. See Holiday
Inns Franchising, Inc. v. Branstad, 537 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Iowa 1995).
85. See, e.g., ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT - SUMMIT AMUSEMENT & DISTRIBUTING LTD,
GAMETECH INTERNATIONAL INC - AUGUST 30, 2006 (2006); AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO ASSET PURCHASE
AGREEMENT BETWEEN ADELPHIA COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION AND COMCAST CORPORATION,
EXHIBIT 2.1 (2005).
86. See, e.g., REVOLVING CREDIT AGREEMENT - ALTRIA GROUP INC, JPMORGAN CHASE BANK NA
AND OTHERS APRIL 15, 2005 (2005).
87. Google: Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/policies/terms/ [https://perma.cc/
4H8E-GTTP] (last modified Oct. 25, 2017).
88. See RADIN, supra note 52, at 4–6. For an analysis of the development of procedural term
innovations, explaining the prevalence of some procedural terms and not others, see generally David A.
Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389.
89. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 64, at 1225–27 (identifying the cognitive limitations that hamper
individuals from accurately assessing forum selection provisions among other ancillary contract terms).
Some have questioned the distinction between access to local litigation and other contract terms. See,
e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Consent, Not Power, as the Basis of Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 7
(advocating presumptive enforceability of forum selection provisions across contract types when
seeking a uniform approach to contract). In addition to seeking a rule that “performs . . . across the full
range of cases,” this economic argument for presumptive enforceability presupposes parties’ abilities to
value the term and a competitive market. See id. at 2, 7 (questioning why local litigation should be
privileged “so long as price and other terms can vary to offset the risk in question”). For a discussion of
the difficulties individual consumers face in assessing such risk in practice, see Korobkin, supra note 64.
90. See KIM, supra note 52, at 121–22; RADIN, supra note 52, at 6; Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 601–02 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting a distinction between the
enforceability of a forum selection provision in a standardized passenger ticket and a “freely negotiated
international agreement between two large corporations”).
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the enforceability of forum selection clauses,91 in the latter half of the twentieth
century, the Supreme Court shifted its position in light of the realities of sophisticated transacting.92 In doing so, the Court identified forum selection provisions as
a potent tool for informed parties in transactions involving “arm’s-length negotiation by experienced and sophisticated businessmen.”93 Yet both the portable nature of the term and the portability of doctrine have reinforced the blurring of
contractual categories.
In The Bremen v. Zapata,94 the Court held enforceable a forum selection clause
in a heavily negotiated contract between corporate entities. The case involved an
American corporate owner of an “ocean-going, self-elevating drilling rig” that
contracted with a German corporation to tow the rig through international
waters.95 The rig, damaged in a storm, was towed to Florida, where the owner,
Zapata, brought suit in contravention of the contractual provision requiring the
parties to litigate in English courts.96 The Court held the forum-selection clause
presumptively enforceable in the absence of a showing that enforcement would
be unreasonable, unfair, or unjust.97 The Court did so with an eye to the specific
nature of the transaction—a dispute arising out of an “American company with
special expertise contracting with a foreign company to tow a complex machine
thousands of miles across seas and oceans.”98 Acknowledging “the expansion of
overseas commercial activities by business enterprises,” the Court explained the
negative impact the traditional doctrine would have upon “the future development of international commercial dealings by Americans,” not least its potential
to hinder the “expansion of American business and industry.”99 As such, the

91. See Leandra Lederman, Viva Zapata!: Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause
Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 422, 426–32 (1991) (discussing “courts’ historical
antipathy to forum-selection clauses”); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of
Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 291, 293–94 (1988)
(describing ability of parties to determine the forum as “a wholesale abandonment of a 100-year taboo
against party autonomy”); Taylor, supra note 78, at 785–86; see also The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1, 9 (1972); Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874) (“[A]greements in
advance to oust the courts of the jurisdiction conferred by law are illegal and void.”); Carbon Black
Exp., Inc. v. The Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959);
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 335 (W. Va. 2009) (“[F]orum-selection clauses
historically were disfavored . . . .”); cf. Cent. Contracting Co. v. Md. Cas. Co., 367 F.2d 341, 345
(3d Cir. 1966) (establishing deference to contractually-stipulated forum under Pennsylvania law in the
absence of proof that it would unreasonably disadvantage one party thereby subverting interests of
justice in case involving two corporate entities).
92. For a brief discussion of the shift toward judicial acceptance of forum selection provisions in
light of growing dockets, acceptance of the doctrine of forum non conviens, and forum shopping by
parties, see Jennifer Dempsey, Forum Selection Clauses in Attorney-Client Agreements: The
Exploitation of Bargaining Power, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 1195, 1199–1200 (2012).
93. See Bremen, 407 U.S. at 12.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 2.
96. See id. at 3–4.
97. See id. at 15.
98. Id. at 8–9.
99. Id.
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Court identified the treatment of forum selection clauses as prima facie valid
absent a showing they are unreasonable as “the correct doctrine to be followed by
federal district courts sitting in admiralty.”100
In Bremen, the Court grounded its rationale for presumptive enforcement of forum selection provisions in the context of a “freely negotiated private international agreement, unaffected by fraud, undue influence, or over weening
bargaining power.”101 It noted, among other things, the “elimination of all . . .
uncertainties [as to the jurisdiction in which a dispute could be litigated] by agreeing in advance on a forum acceptable to both parties [as] an indispensable element in international trade,” “strong evidence that the forum clause was a vital
part of the agreement,” which likely figured into negotiations and pricing,102 as
well as the sophistication of both parties and the negotiated nature of the deal.103
Indeed, the Court explicitly distinguished this case from one in which “[t]he
remoteness of the forum might suggest that the agreement was an adhesive one”
and noted the lack of evidence that litigation in London would prove so costly as
to deprive Zapata of its day in court.104 Thus, the Court’s rationale and framing
highlight the operation of the provision in the context of a transaction involving
highly sophisticated parties, while revealing concerns about adhesion contracts
that might adopt such terms.105
Although scholars note that “later cases could have limited Bremen to its compelling commercial facts,”106 the Supreme Court took less than two decades to
move away from the transactional boundaries suggested in Bremen in a nowfamiliar textbook case: Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute.107 It did so even as it
highlighted transactional objectives as the basis of its rationale.108 This case
involved a cruise ticket provided to a passenger following payment that directed
the passenger to contract terms, which included a forum-selection provision.
Holding the provision enforceable, the Court rejected the appellate court’s effort
to distinguish the case from Bremen based on the non-negotiable instrument at
issue.109 Instead, pointing to the cost savings to the drafter and the potential for
savings to be passed along to the consumer as the relevant rationale for

100. Id. at 10.
101. Id. at 12.
102. Id. at 13–14 (“[I]t would be unrealistic to think that the parties did not conduct their
negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences of the forum clause figuring
prominently in their calculations.”).
103. See id. at 14 (citing favorably the characterization of the agreement as “freely entered into
between two competent parties”).
104. Id. at 17–18.
105. Indeed, the Court’s presentation of facts suggests the contract terms were part of a bidding
process for the deal as a whole, pursuant to which terms were reviewed and revised. See id. at 2–3.
106. O’HARA & RIBSTEIN, supra note 2, at 71.
107. 499 U.S. 585 (1991).
108. Id. at 593.
109. Id. 591–93. Considering an appeal of the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals invoked this distinction suggested by the circumstances in Bremen.
Shute v. Carnival Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d 377, 388 (9th Cir. 1990).
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enforcement,110 the Court crept away from the distinct-contract-type implications
of the precedent on which it relied even as it invoked a transactional rationale.111
In light of the Court’s holding in Carnival Cruise, the burden on an unsophisticated plaintiff to overcome the presumption of enforceability remains high.112
Notwithstanding the doctrine’s intellectual foundation in The Bremen, and its basis in transaction-sensitive reasoning, courts have explicitly rejected the position
that “unequal bargaining power is a ground to reject enforcement of a forum
selection clause in an employment contract.”113
The trends in prevailing doctrinal approaches to forum selection and arbitration
clauses—resistance, then limited enforceability as a law of sophisticated parties,
then presumptive enforcement by courts across transactional contexts—illustrate
a prototypical way creep can function. Describing the modern approach taken by
“most courts around the country” to ancillary terms in “online adhesion contracts,” one district court judge pointed to the one-size-fits-all perspective: the
“basic inquiry as to enforceability boils down to basic contract theory of notice
and informed assent with respect to the terms in question.”114 Courts insist on
110. See id. at 593–94.
111. Justice Stevens challenged this conceptual move in his dissenting opinion. Id. at 597–98
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The fact that the cruise line can reduce its litigation costs, and therefore its
liability insurance premiums, by forcing this choice on its passengers does not, in my opinion, suffice to
render the provision reasonable.”). Justice Stevens also took issue with the Court’s suggestion that the
passenger was “fully and fairly notified about the existence of the choice of forum clause in the fine print
on the back of the ticket,” especially considering that the terms were not provided prior to purchase.
Id. at 597.
112. The majority opinion in Carnival articulated exceptions to the presumptive reasonableness of a
forum selection clause, which have been applied by courts to recognize fraud, deprivation of a day in
court, fundamental unfairness, and the contravention of public policy of the forum state. See id. at 595;
Nat’l Enters., Inc. v. S.C. Ins. Co., No. 97-2185, 1998 WL 756893, at *2 (4th Cir. Oct. 29, 1998) (citing
Carnival Cruise Lines, 499 U.S. at 595) (“A choice of forum provision may be found unreasonable if
(1) its formation was induced by fraud or overreaching; (2) the complaining party ‘will for all practical
purposes be deprived of his day in court’ because of the grave inconvenience or unfairness of the
selected forum; (3) the fundamental unfairness of the chosen law may deprive the plaintiff of a remedy;
or (4) its enforcement would contravene a strong public policy of the forum state.” (citation omitted)).
Nonetheless, the burden remains high and is met when cases involve circumstances beyond an
imbalance of power. Dempsey, supra note 92, at 1203–04. For example, in the employment context, in
Sudduth v. Occidental Peruana, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Tex. 1999), the court acknowledged the
distinction between a sophisticated party agreement as in Bremen, on one hand, and one involving an
individual and corporation. The case involved a contract for work to be performed in Peru, which was
written in Spanish and stipulated Peru as the forum for adjudication of any disputes. Id. at 694. The court
pointed to the fact that the employee was forced to sign a contract in a foreign language as well as the
asymmetrically burdensome requirement that the plaintiff travel to Peru in refusing to enforce the
provision. Id. at 695.
113. Marcotte v. Micros Sys., Inc., No. C 14-01372 LB, 2014 WL 4477349, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
11, 2014) (“[A] forum clause is not unreasonable merely because of the parties’ unequal bargaining
power . . . .”).
114. Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750-DPW, 2016 WL 3751652, at *5 (D. Mass.
July 11, 2016). Reversing the district court’s granting of a motion to compel arbitration in light of the
company’s failure to establish that the term was conspicuous, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
nonetheless reiterated the principle that there is “no reason to apply different legal principles [of contract
enforcement] simply because a . . . clause . . . is contained in an online contract.” Cullinane v. Uber
Techs., Inc., 893 F.3d 53, 61 (1st Cir. 2018) (quoting Ajemian v. Yahoo!, Inc., 987 N.E.2d 604, 612
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constructive notice, and at times also require an indication of assent in online consumer contracts. As the adoption of formalities of assent in the consumer context
demonstrates, the distinction between contract types no longer impacts the presumptive enforceability of such provisions.115
B. CREEPING FROM CONSUMER LAW TO GENERAL CONTRACT LAW: CONTRA
PROFERENTEM

Contra proferentem is an admittedly old principle of contract construction that
may have already been in the domain of “general contract law” since Roman
times.116 Yet in its modern form, the doctrine seems to have migrated from a “first
principle of insurance law”117 to modern general contract law. It requires construing ambiguous contracts against those who draft them. Here is a canonical statement of the rule and its rationale in the insurance law context from the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals:
[T]he contra proferentem rule[] is followed in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia, and with good reason. Insurance policies are almost always drafted
by specialists employed by the insurer. In light of the drafters’ expertise and
experience, the insurer should be expected to set forth any limitations on its
liability clearly enough for a common layperson to understand; if it fails to do
this, it should not be allowed to take advantage of the very ambiguities that it
could have prevented with greater diligence.118

Or consider one more, from a state appellate court:
(Mass. App. Ct. 2013)); Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d at 611–12, aff’d, 84 N.E.3d 766 (Mass. 2017)
(“[F]ollowing the modern rule of reasonableness articulated in Bremen v. Zapata Off–Shore Co., we
have held that such clauses will be enforced provided they have been reasonably communicated and
accepted and if, considering all the circumstances, it is reasonable to enforce the provision at issue. . . .
We see no reason to apply different legal principles simply because a forum selection or limitations
clause is contained in an online contract.” (citation omitted)).
115. See Specht v. Netscape Commc’ns Corp., 306 F.3d 17, 35 (2d Cir. 2002); Ajemian, 987 N.E.2d
at 611.
116. For some recent work on contra proferentem (including its long history), see Michelle E.
Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105 (2006)
[hereinafter Boardman, Contra Proferentem]; Michelle Boardman, Penalty Default Rules in Insurance
Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 305 (2013) [Boardman, Penalty Default Rules]; David Horton, Flipping the
Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV. 431 (2009); Ethan J.
Leib & Steve Thel, Contra Proferentem and the Role of the Jury in Contract Interpretation, 87 TEMP. L.
REV. 773 (2015); McCunn, supra note 13. For older treatments, see John T. Flynn, The Rule Contra
Proferentem in the Government Contract Interpretation Process, 11 PUB. CONT. L.J. 379, 381 (1980);
David S. Miller, Insurance as Contract: The Argument for Abandoning the Ambiguity Doctrine, 88
COLUM. L. REV. 1849, 1849–53 (1988); Michael B. Rappaport, The Ambiguity Rule and Insurance Law:
Why Insurance Contracts Should Not Be Construed Against the Drafter, 30 GA. L. REV. 171, 254
(1995).
117. Kenneth S. Abraham, A Theory of Insurance Policy Interpretation, 95 MICH. L. REV. 531, 531
(1996); see also KENNETH S. ABRAHAM, INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 37 (5th ed. 2010). But see
Ed E. Duncan, The Demise of Contra Proferentem as the Primary Rule of Insurance Contract
Interpretation in Ohio and Elsewhere, 41 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1121 (2006).
118. Phillips v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 302, 312 (7th Cir. 1992) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Kunin v. Benefit Tr., Life Ins. Co., 910 F.2d 534, 540 (9th Cir. 1990)).
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Contra proferentem has a usual application. In the typical coverage contest
between an insurer and its insured, ambiguous terms in the insurance policy
are construed in favor of the insured. This rule of construction recognizes the
disparity in bargaining power that typically exists between an insurer and an
insured, particularly since insurance contracts are often contracts of
adhesion.119

The rule has a long history in contract law,120 but the conventional story of the
doctrine as a core of insurance law which, in turn, gave courts further comfort
with more applications of the doctrine outside insurance law, is widely
accepted.121 Indeed, the most recent historical work on the doctrine seems to confirm that the doctrine as a matter of general contract law was essentially moribund
until its revivification within the insurance contract context, where its justification
made more sense to courts.122
Courts and contract theorists have offered a variety of rationales for contra
proferentem that extend beyond the narrow insurance context. For example, the
dominant explanation of the rule is that it encourages clarity and discourages ambiguity: if drafters can reliably expect contracts to be construed against them,
they will draft clearer contracts.123 Although the benefit anyone could reasonably
expect in a consumer context for clearer contracts is probably overstated (because
no one reads their contracts anyway),124 this rationale is not targeted to explain
the doctrine within any particularized transactional context, as it could apply to
sophisticated parties as well. Ostensibly, everyone could benefit from clearer contracts (though many sophisticated parties probably draft ambiguously to give
themselves room to adjust over time as they see how things play out). Yet this
dominant explanation seems secondary to a more directly pro-consumer rationale
in the insurance context: the doctrine serves to protect the public against institutions that are inclined to draft obscure contracts to entrap consumers. Unlike the

119. Econ. Premier Assurance Co. v. W. Nat’l Mut. Ins. Co., 839 N.W.2d 749, 754 (Minn. Ct. App.
2013) (citations omitted).
120. The lengthy version of the narrative is told by Horton, supra note 116, at 438–46. But Horton
confirms its cohesiveness principally as an insurance contract doctrine in the common law by the “last
half of the nineteenth century.” Id. at 440.
121. See Leib & Thel, supra note 116, at 780 n.50.
122. See McCunn, supra note 13.
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. A (1981); Abraham, supra note 117, at
533; cf. Horton, supra note 116, at 433 (discussing conventional explanations); Richard A. Posner, The
Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1608 (2005) (“The doctrine of
contra proferentem may still be a sensible tiebreaker, on the ground that the party who drafted the
contract was probably in the better position to avoid ambiguities. But this is not always the case.”);
Rappaport, supra note 116, at 178–87 (discussing formulations of the ambiguity rule in insurance law).
124. See generally Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone
Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 19 (2014);
Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the ‘Opportunity to Read’ in Contract Law, 5 EUR. REV. CONTRACT L. 1
(2009).
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more basic generalized justification for clearer contracts, in the insurance context
the most plausible justification is more particularized to consumer contracting.125
And yet a recent study126 of the doctrine by one of us found it applying to a
wide-ranging set of contracts outside the insurance context, including in employment,127 marriage settlements,128 stock certificates;129 money market documents;130 co-op apartment agreements;131 property leases;132 landlord-tenant
disputes;133 property sales using form agreements;134 and lawyers’ letters.135
This caselaw—and many states’ pattern jury instructions136—underscore that
contra proferetem is not a doctrine limited to insurance contracts, but has much
wider application in the general law of contract. Courts sometimes find the rule
especially important in the take-it-or-leave-it context of standard form contracting,137 but the rule has crept back outward and is not a specialized interpretive
125. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. A (1981); Posner, supra note 123, at
1590 (“The second of these tie-breaking rules, contra proferentem, is conventionally defended on the
ground that the drafting party may be able to pull a fast one on the other party, a defense that fails when
the other party is commercially sophisticated.”). To be fair, the justification for contra proferentem that
is now in vogue among the law-and-econ set is that insurance companies themselves want clarity and
uniformity in the interpretation of their standardized provisions—and that clarity is especially important
in insurance—so insurers benefit from this rule, which helps courts sustain such clarity and uniformity.
See, e.g., Boardman, Contra Proferentem, supra note 116; Boardman, Penalty Default Rules, supra note
116; Daniel Schwarcz, Coverage Information in Insurance Law, 101 MINN. L. REV. 1457 (2017). Still,
we assume insurance companies would be delighted to do away with the rule—which is calibrated to
work to their disadvantage—and because contra proferentem can be designed in many states to be
applied by fact-finders rather than judges, see Leib & Thel, supra note 116, at 784, it is hard to see the
doctrine as very likely to produce consistent and uniform interpretations in the courts in actual practice.
126. The findings cited here are drawn from Leib & Thel, supra note 116, at 778–80.
127. Gibson v. Nye Frontier Ford, Inc., 205 P.3d 1091, 1097 (Alaska 2009); Abrams v. Horizon
Corp., 669 P.2d 51, 57 (Ariz. 1983); Int’l Billing Servs., Inc. v. Emigh, 101 Cal. Rptr. 2d 532, 538 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000).
128. Hussein-Scott v. Scott, 298 P.3d 179, 183 (Alaska 2013) (holding that although Alaska law
disfavors contra proferentem in marriage settlements, it is a tool of interpretation under Florida law);
McMullin v. McMullin, 338 S.W.3d 315, 322 (Ky. Ct, App. 2001) (applying the rule to a marriage
settlement agreement).
129. Kaiser Alum. Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 399 (Del. 1996).
130. Craig v. Hastings State Bank, 380 N.W.2d 618, 621 (Neb. 1986).
131. 1901 Wyo. Ave. Coop. Ass’n v. Lee, 345 A.2d 456, 463 (D.C. 1975); see also Highland Lakes
Country Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Franzino, 122, 892 A.2d 646, 660 (N.J. 2006) (Wallace, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that ambiguities should be construed against drafters of bylaws of a country club).
132. Kutkowski v. Princeville Prince Golf Course, LLC, 300 P.3d 1009, 1019 (Haw. 2013); Berg v.
Hudesman, 801 P.2d 222, 233–34 (Wash. 1990); Owens v. McDermott, Will & Emery, 736 N.E.2d 145,
154 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
133. Md. Arms Ltd. P’ship v. Connell, 786 N.W.2d 15, 25 (Wis. 2010).
134. DeWolfe v. Hingham Centre, Ltd., 985 N.E.2d 1187, 1195–96 (Mass. 2013).
135. Lai Ling Cheng v. Modansky Leasing Co., 539 N.E.2d 570, 573 (N.Y. 1989).
136. The pattern jury instructions in many states are cited and discussed in Leib & Thel, supra note
116, at 779–80.
137. See Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168, 171 (Cal. 1966) (“These principles of interpretation
of insurance contracts have found new and vivid restatement in the doctrine of the adhesion contract.”);
Anderson v. Baker, 641 P.2d 1035, 1039 (Mont. 1982) (same); Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Avery, 593 S.E.
2d 424, 433 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (“[A]mbiguous contracts (particularly contracts of adhesion) are
construed against the drafter.”); Joyner v. Adams, 361 S.E.2d 902, 905–06 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987)
(highlighting the rule’s central importance in cases of adhesion contracts); Md. Arms Ltd. P’ship v.
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regime only for unsophisticated consumers. Although some courts speculate
whether it makes sense to give sophisticated parties the benefit of the rule at
all,138 the doctrine more or less will apply to any written agreement between any
parties where there was no joint drafting effort.139 This creep disables theorists
and courts from providing a satisfying unitary account of the doctrine, which was
revived from near-death for one purpose, but is put to others too.
This case study is useful both to illustrate creep that occurs from seemingly
specialized interpretive regimes designed to help consumers back into the stream
of general contract law—and to demonstrate how underlying policies, values,
and doctrines can morph as the creep occurs. In the case of contra proferentem,
the insurance law versions of the rule were much more aggressive efforts to construe contracts against issuers early in the interpretive process.140 Parallel to the
creep, however, the doctrine itself was thinned out to serve as a last resort tiebreaker,141 an instantiation of the doctrine that neither promotes clear policies nor
helps consumers as often as it was probably designed to. This kind of patchwork
is expected when interpretive regimes cannot sustain their boundaries—and
Connell, 786 N.W.2d at 25 (noting that the rule is particularly applicable in standardized contracts); see
also Judicial Council of Cal. Civil Jury Instructions, CACI No. 320 Interpretation—Construction
Against Drafter (2016) (“This . . . rule is applied with particular force in the case of adhesion contracts.”
(quoting Badie v. Bank of Am., 79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 273, 287 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998))); 1 PHILIP L. BRUNER &
PATRICK J. O’CONNOR, JR., CONSTRUCTION LAW § 3:28 (2014) (“[T]he contra proferentem rule and
adhesion contract analysis have historically been inextricably bound.”).
138. See Joyner, 361 S.E.2d at 905–06 (rejecting the application of the rule “where the parties were
at arms length and were equally sophisticated”); see generally Hazel Glenn Beh, Reassessing the
Sophisticated Insured Exception, 39 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 85 (2003) (identifying a trend of
sophisticated party insureds being excepted from contra proferentem in courts, but arguing that it still
makes sense in many cases to apply the doctrine even to insured sophisticated parties).
139. See Morgan Stanley v. New Eng. Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 270, 279–80 (2d Cir. 2000) (deciding that
the linchpin was that the insured—Morgan Stanley—did not negotiate its terms and therefore it did not
matter that Morgan Stanley is by all measures a sophisticated party); see also Pittston Co. Ultramar Am.
Ltd. v. Allianz Ins. Co., 124 F.3d 508, 521 (3d Cir. 1997) (“[T]he dispositive question is not merely
whether the insured is a sophisticated corporate entity, but rather whether the insurance contract is
negotiated, jointly drafted or drafted by the insured.”); FabArc Steel Supply, Inc. v. Composite Constr.
Sys., Inc., 914 So. 2d 344, 359–60 (Ala. 2005) (focusing on the “arm’s length negotiations” as the reason
not to apply contra proferentem); Owens-Ill., Inc. v. United Ins. Co., 625 A.2d 1, 15 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1993) (focusing on whether the contract was jointly negotiated rather than focusing only on
“sophistication”).
140. See, e.g., J & W Foods Corp. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 723 So. 2d 550, 552 (Miss.
1998); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Garriga, 636 So.2d 658, 662 (Miss. 1994); Williams v. Life Ins. Co.
of Ga., 367 So. 2d 922, 925 (Miss. 1979); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with
Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 972 (1970) (suggesting that ambiguity may not be a seriously
enforced threshold for applying the rule).
141. See Hurd v. Ill. Bell Tel. Co., 136 F. Supp. 125, 134 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (“At best it is a secondary
rule of interpretation, a ‘last resort’ which may be invoked after all of the ordinary interpretative guides
have been exhausted.”); see also Kaiser Alum. Corp. v. Matheson, 681 A.2d 392, 399 (Del. 1996);
Moore v. Lomas Mortg. USA, 796 F. Supp. 300, 305 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Petersen v. Magna Corp., 773
N.W.2d 564, 570 (Mich. 2009); cf. Fisher v. Cmty. Banks of Colo., Inc., 300 P.3d 565, 569 (Colo. App.
2010) (describing the doctrine as one of several “‘secondary’ guides” to resolve remaining ambiguities
after the “primary” interpretive rules have been applied); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206
reporter’s note cmt. A (“[O]ne may doubt that the rule is ‘the last one to be resorted to, and never to be
applied except when other rules of interpretation fail.’” (citation omitted)).
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contra proferentem illustrates that dynamic well, even if it is not a perfect example of a purely specialized regime because of its early etiology as pervading more
general contract law.142
***
Our case studies here are only that: examples of a common phenomenon that
implicate some costs and risks of the unintended consequences of setting up fragmented regimes for contract law. Nothing we say here requires that this impulse
for harmonization of fragmented contract regimes always obtains—or that it is
always inappropriate.143 Indeed, this dynamic is just what one would expect of
the common law, but heretofore few have trained their eyes on the risks creep can
cause. A fuller inquiry would identify a few contexts in which creep has been perfectly well contained—where the law sustains its own fragmentation moderately
successfully. Although there has been much harmonization between the Uniform
Commercial Code’s treatment of sales of goods and the modern common law of
contract, there remain a few specialized rules where fragmentation has been successful, if much criticized. For example, the common law of contract continues
to impose the “preexisting duty rule,” whereas modifications under the UCC’s
§ 2-209(1) are permitted without consideration as long as they are made in good
faith.144 We could develop other examples, too.145 But that fragmentation is
142. Gilson et al., supra note 2, at 81–86, tell a similar kind of story about the “reasonable
expectations” doctrine, which also crept outward from insurance law. They find that as it crept, it lost its
way—and courts had a hard time gerrymandering it to new purposes just as they failed to keep it focused
on its old purpose. For more on the doctrine, see Leib, supra note 31.
143. We acknowledge this supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., Kevin M. Teeven, Development of Reform of the Preexisting Duty Rule and Its
Persistent Survival, 47 ALA. L. REV. 387, 445–53 (1996).
145. Consider, for example, the well-entrenched fragmentation within insurance law between the
interpretive principles that apply to first-party insurance contracts (when a policyholder buys a policy to
protect her property against damage or accidents, say) and third-party insurance contracts (when a
policyholder buys a policy to protect against her liability to a third party for her own conduct). See Port
Auth. of N.Y. & N. J. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 311 F.3d 226, 233 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he parties to each
form of insurance contract assume vastly different roles. In the third-party setting, the insurer and
insured may generally be considered allies, but in the first-party context, the insured and carrier are
placed in an adversarial position. We are persuaded that the time-honored distinction between the two
types of insurance coverage is valid and should be maintained.”); Great N. Ins. Co. v. Mt. Vernon Fire
Ins. Co., 708 N.E.2d 167, 170 (N.Y. 1999) (“[W]holly different interests are protected by first-party
coverage and third-party coverage.”); Winding Hills Condo. Ass’n v. N. Am. Specialty Ins. Co., 752
A.2d 837, 840 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2000) (sustaining the doctrinal distinction between the
“continuous trigger rule” for third-party claims and the “manifest trigger rule” for first-party claims).
Ultimately, courts tend to pursue “solicitousness for victims of mass toxic torts” in establishing readings
of, and rules for, third-party coverage, but are willing to apply stricter rules that do not vindicate “public
rights” when construing first-party coverage. Id.
Yet notwithstanding the “time-honored” separate tracks of first-party and third-party policies—which
pursue different values—Chaim Saiman argues persuasively that the development of “bad faith” law in
insurance (when an insurer fails to settle or pay a claim in bad faith) actually jumped from the thirdparty to the first-party context without much resistance. See Chaim Saiman, The Restatement of Law of
Liability Insurance and the Creation of Insurance Law (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 11–13).
Whether that is because both tracks of insurance law were just becoming harmonized with general
contract law is hard to say without deeper study.
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sometimes successful does not inspire confidence that it can always be,146 such
that we can forget its risks—and too often courts and theorists fail to understand
the dynamics of fragmentation. In Part III below, we start to explore some of the
determinants and causes of creep to help isolate how it happens. Only then can
we get a handle on more easily stopping it in the contexts where we should be
especially cautious about law falling off track.
III. WHAT’S CAUSING CREEP?
In the preceding Part we identified creep from commercial settings and highly
negotiated contracts between sophisticated parties into the realm of consumer
contract. We also demonstrated creep from a specialized interpretive regime of
insurance doctrine back into wide application in the general law of contract,
where it first appeared and then was revivified. More generally, these examples
underscore the difficulty at times of bracketing specialized areas of law, even in
areas recognized as discrete transactional types, such as insurance. As the discussion above suggests, although these “creeping” doctrines may not have necessarily disavowed the possibility of broader application, each emerges with a
rationale grounded in a particular transactional structure that creeps into applications in different transaction types. In this Part, we focus on some of the mechanisms and structural aspects of contract that contribute to creep.
We offer below three explanations of how the process of creep can occur.
First, we explore how the instability of party-status designations (is someone a sophisticated party or a consumer or both?) pushes courts away from clean fragmentation of contract regimes. Second, we observe how modularity, portability,
and innovation in contract design makes possible the migration of doctrine and
terms, which themselves end up carrying doctrine with them. And finally, we
146. Another area of contract law that sustains doctrinal distinctions but, at times, nonetheless creeps
back and forth is that of commercial and residential leases—and their fragmentation from general
contract law and from each other. Although, as one court asserts, “[i]t is almost axiomatic that
commercial leases may and should be governed by a different rule than residential leases,” 29 Holding
Corp. v. Diaz, 775 N.Y.S.2d 807, 814 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2004), the migration of rationales and categories
can be seen in the history of the doctrine. In the nineteenth century in New York, a landlord had no duty
to mitigate damages by trying to re-rent a property abandoned by the original tenant. Becar v. Flues, 64
N.Y. 518 (1876); see also 29 Holding Corp. 775 N.Y. at 810 (identifying Becar as a “seminal case in this
area”). In the telling of one court, the rule that landlords had no duty to mitigate in the context of
commercial or residential leases reflected “common law principles . . . in recognition of property rules
from feudal times.” Rubin v. Dondysh, 549 N.Y.S.2d 579, 581 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1989), rev’d, 588 N.Y.
S.2d 504 (N.Y. App. Term 1991). More recently, some courts asserted that “there is no longer good
reason—if there ever was—why leases should be governed by rules different from those applying to
contracts in general,” including an obligation by the non-breaching party to mitigate any loss following
a breach. Parkwood Realty Co. v. Marcano, 353 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1974). And yet, other
courts continue to find no duty to mitigate in commercial leases, whether as an invocation of the original
principle or as a recognition of the nature of “business transactions.” Holy Props. Ltd., L.P. v. Kenneth
Cole Prods., Inc., 661 N.E.2d 694 (N.Y. 1995). Moreover, still other courts have used the principle of
the distinctiveness of lease agreements in the commercial lease context to reestablish the lack of a duty
to mitigate in the residential context. See Rios v. Carrillo, 861 N.Y.S.2d 129, 130 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008)
(finding that “[a]lthough Holy Props. involved a commercial lease . . . [t]here is simply no basis for
limiting the broad language of Holy Props” and thus applying its reasoning to a residential lease).
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show how migrating metaphors and conventional analogical reasoning in the
common law of contract can cause creep. This is not an exhaustive or mutually
exclusive list of how creep happens; there may be other dynamics in play—and,
as we show, interaction effects among our mechanisms. But viewed together,
these mechanisms reflect competing tendencies in contract law: a tendency toward general principles of contract as a default position in the law as well as an
enduring context sensitivity, which is not consistently circumscribed.
A. CATEGORY INSTABILITY

It is not a secret that the terms “sophisticated parties” and “consumers” are not
self-defining. Schwartz and Scott define sophisticated parties to include corporate
entities with at least five employees.147 Goldberg defines sophisticated party
transactions as “agreements for which both parties could be expected to have
access to counsel.”148 These definitions—which are not adopted as law by any jurisdiction that purports to have a law for sophisticated parties—are probably
adequate for theorizing. They also show that some scholars grapple with the problem. They fall shy, however, of being a reliable basis for legal implementation. In
a world of small businesses and multinational corporations, with a range of merchants and business entities in between, it is easy to conjure a host of transactions
involving significant differentials in power or substantive sophistication that
might fall within these very categories.
Thus, for example, compare two contracts: (1) a transaction between a gift
shop owned by a retired teacher who incorporates it as a limited liability company, employing herself and four others, and a provider of garbage pick-up services that operates on a statewide level, on one hand; and (2) a transaction between
two multinational corporations, on the other hand. Should contra proferentem
apply the same way in both transactions? Should we enforce non-negotiable boilerplate terms in both contexts? Should courts treat similarly the presence or absence of a term identifying both parties as drafters in both contexts? Although
Schwartz and Scott’s “sophisticated party” categorization offers a neat bright
line, it also presumes that courts will and ought to treat such potentially dissimilar
transactions similarly across the board.149As these examples suggest,150 however,
there will be a significant range in the extent to which “[t]hese economic entities
can be expected to understand how to make business contracts.”151 And this is the
real substantive reason Schwartz and Scott want to have a sophisticated party category in the first place. Small businesses are likely to face challenges stemming
from limits of resources and access to information to say nothing of cognitive
147. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 544–45.
148. GOLDBERG, supra note 22, at 1.
149. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 544 (suggesting a category of sophisticated parties
including “(1) an entity that is organized in the corporate form and that has five or more employees, (2) a
limited partnership, or (3) a professional partnership such as a law or accounting firm”).
150. These examples involve slight changes to those offered by Schwartz and Scott to illustrate their
proposed contract categories. See id.
151. Id.
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biases, which more experienced or powerful firms might avoid.152 It is thus easy
to see both why it makes substantive sense to have a tracked or fragmented contract law and also that the challenges for line-drawing are patent, making the
tracks routinely unstable.
Access to counsel similarly proves a capacious category in a world in which
lawyers range from sole practitioners, on one hand, to white-shoe global firms, on
the other, with a host of legal practices and levels of sophistication and client
service in between. As a result of its inclusiveness, Goldberg’s access-to-counsel
test, like the simple sophisticated party model outlined by Schwartz and Scott,
risks oversimplifying the very transactional distinctions it aims to address.
Moreover, highlighting the fuzziness of the boundaries these tests offer, the two
approaches do not produce coterminous results. They would treat differently, for
example, an individual employee who negotiated her employment contract terms
and had a friend who was a lawyer review the agreement between her and the
employer, a publicly traded software company.153 For Goldberg, that is a sophisticated party transaction, but not for Scott and Schwartz.
In practice, courts do not prove insensitive to the dimensions of transactional
context that these examples suggest. Instead, courts sometimes attempt the very
context sensitivity demanded by a fragmented contract law. However, in doing
so, they contend with the instability of the categories that ought to guide the
tracking of contract type, leading to creep.
This dynamic is on display in our contra proferentem case study. Although the
rule seemed largely to be a pro-consumer interpretive principle within the insurance context, eventually courts were faced with whether to give the “benefit” of
the rule to sophisticated parties who did not have a hand in negotiating their form
contracts with vendors, providers, and insurers. Although courts and commentators sometimes presume that there is a “sophisticated policyholder” exemption
from contra proferentem,154 the weight of the evidence points to co-drafting and
joint negotiation, rather than “sophistication,” however defined, as the central criteria for the non-application of contra proferentem.155 Thus, even when the

152. Miller, Formalism, supra note 1, at 522 (citing Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False
Dichotomies of Contract Law, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 304–68 (2005)). Miller notes as well that
this categorization implicitly relies on size and entity formation as determining factors of sophistication,
an approach that caselaw does not follow. Id.
153. See Am. Software v. Ali, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 477, 482 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding contract
enforceable as “the result of an arm’s-length negotiation between two sophisticated and experienced
parties”).
154. See, e.g., Miller, Formalism, supra note 1, at 504; Jeffery W. Stempel, Reassessing the
“Sophisticated” Policyholder Defense in Insurance Coverage Litigation, 42 DRAKE L. REV. 807 (1993).
155. See Leib & Thel, supra note 116, at 781–82 (“But just having a sophisticated nondrafting party
isn’t enough to form a general exception to the rule. The crux seems to be actual negotiation,
deliberation, and dickering over terms.” (footnote omitted)). Because contra proferentem does not
reflect the preference of at least some sophisticated parties, corporate transactional documents, such as
credit, purchase, or merger agreements, can include a standardized term stating that the parties “have
participated jointly in the negotiation and drafting” of the agreement, and:
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consumer is a corporate entity rather than an unsophisticated individual, the rule
holds against the drafter.156
Perhaps seeing sophisticated parties as capable of being consumers in some
transactions precipitated the process we call creep, enabling judges to again
expand the application of contra proferentem outside the narrow insurance context to other transactions. Courts are still not completely indifferent to the bargaining power or status of the parties.157 But they have largely given up sharply
differentiated contract regimes for purposes of contra proferentem, at least in part
because the categories that serve as the thresholds for a relevant track themselves
prove porous.
The fluidity between sophisticated parties and consumers also gives rise to an
example of creep within our forum selection clause case study. In a 2012 case
involving an individual Facebook user’s challenge to the enforceability of a
In the event an ambiguity or question of intent or interpretation arises, [the] Agreement . . .
shall be construed as if drafted jointly by the parties . . . and no presumption or burden of
proof shall arise favoring or disfavoring any party by virtue of the authorship of any provisions of [the] Agreement . . . .
Exhibit 4.16: 364–Day Credit Agreement Among Harley–Davidson, Inc. et al., JPMorgan Chase Bank,
N.A., et al., SEC (May 1, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/793952/00007939521
8000012/hog-12312017xexhibit416.htm [https://perma.cc/322M-B6TJ]. Considering the phenomenon
of creep and the tendency for courts to impose contra proferentem, we can only speculate about the
force of this provision in the face of evidence of drafting by one party and of the possibility of the
provision migrating into transactions beyond those drafted by global corporate law firms. In any event,
lots of searching on the central contract database Onecle does not suggest contra proferentem “opt-outs”
are actually common for sophisticated parties and agreements.
156. See, e.g., Minn. Sch. Bds. Ass’n Ins. Tr. v. Emps. Ins., 331 F.3d 579, 581 (8th Cir. 2003) (“[T]he
Minnesota Supreme Court has applied the rule in disputes between parties apparently having equal
bargaining power.”); Morgan Stanley v. New Eng. Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 270, 279 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[T]here
is no general rule in New York denying sophisticated businesses the benefit of contra proferentem.”); St.
Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. MetPath, Inc., 38 F.Supp.2d 1087, 1092 (D. Minn. 1998) (rejecting
argument that contra proferentem “should not apply to the Defendants because they are large,
sophisticated companies”); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1219 (Ill.
1992) (holding that “any insured, whether large and sophisticated or not, must enter into a contract with
the insurer which is written according to the insurer’s pleasure by the insurer. Generally, since little or
no negotiation occurs in this process, the insurer has total control of the terms and the drafting of the
contract,” so contra proferentem should apply) (citations omitted); CPS Chem. Co., v. Cont’l Ins. Co.,
536 A.2d 311, 318 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988) (“These principles are no less applicable merely
because the insured is itself a corporate giant. The critical fact remains that the ambiguity was caused by
language selected by the insurer.”); 2 STEVEN PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:24 (3d ed. 2015)
(“Avoidance of the rule . . . is not required merely because an insured party is a business rather than an
individual.”).
157. See Highland Lakes Country Club & Cmty. Ass’n v. Franzino, 892 A.2d 646, 660 (N.J. 2006)
(stating that the rule should be especially favored in case of parties with unequal “bargaining power”);
Md. Arms Ltd. P’ship v. Connell, 786 N.W.2d 15, 25 (Wis. 2010) (suggesting that a “stronger
bargaining position” by the drafting party is a reason to favor an interpretation against the drafter);
Joyner v. Adams, 361 S.E.2d 902, 905–06 (N.C. Ct. App.1987) (declining to apply the rule where
“parties were at arms length” and “equally sophisticated” and stating it is “usually” reserved for those
“where one party is in a stronger bargaining position”); Seligson, Morris & Neuburger v. Fairbanks
Whitney Corp., 257 N.Y.S.2d 706, 713 (N.Y. App. Div. 1965) (considering it a strike against application
of the rule where those “who participated in the making of the written agreement were sophisticated
persons with extensive business, and some with legal, training”).
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forum selection provision in a case alleging discrimination against him for his
Muslim identity, a federal district court pointed to the user’s internet sophistication as the basis for determining that the threshold issue of notice had been established.158 Considering whether Facebook’s “Terms of Use” were reasonably
communicated to the user, the court distinguished the case from those involving
“sophisticated commercial entities,” and identified the user as a “consumer.”159
However, the court invoked the user’s relative social networking sophistication
in determining that the terms were reasonably communicated and therefore enforceable. The court asserted, “it is not too much to expect that an internet user
whose social networking was so prolific that losing Facebook access allegedly
caused him mental anguish would understand” that a “Terms of Use” hyperlink
allows access to terms.160 Underscoring the relevance of the user’s internet
sophistication, the opinion in Fteja suggests particular considerations prompted
by this transaction type. The court allowed that, “to many people,” unlike for the
user, “[t]he mechanics of the internet surely remain unfamiliar.”161
The court thereby identifies a particular category, that of internet or social
media sophistication. It emphasizes, “for those to whom the internet is in an indispensable part of daily life, clicking the hyperlinked phrase is the twenty-first century equivalent of turning over the cruise ticket,” thereby referencing Carnival
Cruise.162 The court essentially creates a hybrid category of sophisticated consumer. Whether this reflects a creep of sophisticated party categorization into the
consumer context, or of consumer contracts toward the realm of sophisticated
party contract doctrine, this example demonstrates the difficulty judges at times
face in maintaining sharp boundaries between transaction types. Paradoxically,
the cause of this difficulty appears to be judges’ awareness of the implications of
context. As much as they try to be sensitive to context, judges can, as in this case,
find themselves participating in doctrinal creep as categories get hybridized.
Two more recent cases further complicate the hybrid category of sophisticated
internet consumer. In doing so, they demonstrate the struggle courts face categorizing new developments in transactional practices—and how they foreseeably
lead to creep.
In Berkson v. Gogo LLC, federal district Judge Jack B. Weinstein asserted that
“internet consumers” “require clearer notice than do traditional retail buyers.”163
Holding the terms of use embedded in the webpage of in-flight wifi provider
Gogo unenforceable in 2015, Judge Weinstein pointed to the consumer’s

158. Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 836 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
159. Id. at 836 (distinguishing enforceability of online “browsewrap” terms of use based on whether
they are being imposed on corporations or individual consumers).
160. Id. at 839.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. 97 F. Supp. 3d 359, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (rejecting defendant’s claim of adequate notice of
automatic renewal term, mandatory arbitration provision, and waiver of venue in online terms of use).
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“one shotter” status, as opposed to the offeror’s “repeat player” position.164 In
this light, he placed the burden of “the duty to explain the relevance of the critical
terms” on the offeror.165 Undertaking an extended “assess[ment]” of the “attributes of the average internet user,”166 the doctrinal landscape,167 as well as of
forms of online notification and assent,168 the opinion considers both the transaction type and the nature of the parties in the specific circumstance of online contracting.169 In doing so, the opinion presents online contracting by a consumer for
a product as a special type of transaction, which prompts a particular interpretive
posture by the judge.170
A subsequent case the next year, Salameno v. Gogo Inc.,171 complicates this
analysis by presenting another hybrid category similar to the “sophisticated
internet user” invoked in Fteja. In Salameno, airline passengers using the Gogo
in-flight wifi service challenged the enforceability of terms, which were communicated, as they were in Berkson, in the form of a so-called “sign-in-wrap agreement.”172 Though the facts in Salameno hew closely to those in Berkson,173 Judge
Weinstein distinguished the cases, emphasizing that the users in Salameno were
“not unsophisticated lay internet users.”174 Instead, holding the terms enforceable,
the opinion characterized the Salameno plaintiffs as “[s]ophisticated business
travelers who repeatedly purchased and used Gogo’s product.”175 According to
the opinion, these individuals “can be assumed to have been aware of the

164. Id. at 382–83 (citing Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 97–104 (1974)).
165. Id.
166. Id. at 377–83. In a fifty-four page opinion containing an involved overview of current literature
on internet use, the court identifies the “lack of empirical evidence concerning actual notice” of “the
average internet user.” Id. at 380.
167. Id. at 383–94.
168. Id. at 394–402.
169. See id. at 403–04 (“Proof of special know-how based on the background of the potential buyer
or adequate warning of adverse terms by the design of the agreement page or pages should be required
before adverse terms, such as compelled arbitration or forced venue, are enforced.”). Focusing on the
category of “sign-in-wraps,” in which notice of terms occurs via the sign-in process to a site, id. at 389,
the court presents a four-part inquiry to determine enforceability. Id. at 402. Criticizing the approach in
Berkson, a federal district court in Massachusetts declined to follow the likely “fact intensive analysis,”
hewing instead to a formal test of reasonable notice. Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750DPW, 2016 WL 3751652, at *7 (D. Mass. July 11, 2016). In Cullinane, the court turned back to a
general contract approach in which “enforceability turns more on customary and established principles
of contract law,” id. at *6, defaulting to the undifferentiated take on arbitration discussed in Part II
supra.
170. See Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 403–05 (contrasting the case with the “contract scenario in
Carnival Cruise” and weighing the level of awareness of the terms of the deal of the particular
consumer).
171. No. 16-CV-0487, 2016 WL 4005783, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 25, 2016).
172. Id.; see also Berkson, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 399–401.
173. See Erin Canino, Note, The Electronic “Sign-in-Wrap” Contract: Issues of Notice and Assent,
the Average Internet User Standard, and Unconscionability, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 535, 569 (2016)
(“At first glance the Salameno case appears to mirror Berkson almost exactly . . . .”).
174. Salameno, 2016 WL 4005783, at *6.
175. Id. at *1.
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arbitration clause where they repeatedly ordered the service.”176 Constructing a
category of “practiced individuals,” the judge opined, “[i]n today’s technologically driven society, it is reasonable to charge experienced users . . . with knowledge of . . . how to access the terms of use.”177
Salameno thus presents another fragmented categorization, a consumer
deemed “sophisticated business traveler.” As with Berkson, this approach demonstrates the inclination by judges to account, at times, for subtleties of relational
and transactional distinctions. A somewhat paradoxical result of this sensitivity
to context, it proves hard for the court to maintain stable boundaries between
party types in their doctrinal elaborations, pushing doctrine toward a generalizing
tendency. The blurring of party and transaction types thereby complicates the
project of recognizing distinct transactional spheres that a fragmented contract
law approach envisions—and on which it is premised.
The common designation of attorneys as sophisticated parties serves as one more
illustration of the hybridity and fluidity of categorization that threatens fragmented
regimes because creep pushes towards generalization. Courts have deemed lawyers
sophisticated parties even in cases in which they function as consumers acceding to
non-negotiable online terms.178 In other contexts, courts have taken a more granular view to consider a lawyer’s expertise when determining whether he qualifies
as a “sophisticated” party.179 Courts have also invoked the lawyer versus nonlawyer distinction as a benchmark to establish a non-sophisticated party transaction. Thus, for example, in Meyer v. Kalanick in 2016,180 a federal district court
drew on the distinction between lawyer and consumer to hold that a user of
Uber’s smartphone application was not bound by terms embedded in a hyperlink
under the registration button. In doing so, the court characterized the plaintiff as
a “reasonable (non-lawyer) smartphone user” who could thus not be assumed to
be “aware of the likely contents of ‘Terms of Service.’”181 Although the district
court’s holding in Meyer v. Kalanick was vacated on appeal,182 the Second
Circuit’s application of general contract principles reflects the impact of creep.
Following “precedent and basic principles of contract law,” the Court of
Appeals identified the need to “consider the perspective of a reasonably prudent
smartphone user” in determining the conspicuousness of notice of terms of service.183 Thus, reacting in part to the confusion hybrid party types can sow, the
Court of Appeals embraced a generalizing doctrine.

176. Id.
177. Id. at *6.
178. See Miller, Formalism, supra note 1, at 513–14 (discussing Feldman v. Google, Inc., 513 F.
Supp. 2d 229 (E.D. Pa. 2007)).
179. See Reilley v. Richards, 632 N.E.2d 507, 509 (Ohio 1994) (holding that a lawyer with no
knowledge of real estate law could not be treated as a sophisticated party).
180. 200 F. Supp. 3d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), vacated sub nom. Meyer v. Uber Techs., Inc., 868 F.3d 66
(2d Cir. 2017).
181. Id. at 421.
182. See Meyer, 868 F.3d at 66.
183. Id. at 77.
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As we can see, both generalizing tendencies and the instinct to context sensitivity can move doctrine around among different transaction types, with an attendant
risk that law gets applied in potentially ill-fitting ways. The harmonizer should already be considering the differential impact of one law on different kinds of transactions and contracts among those with different relative party statuses. But those
who want clean, cordoned off, and fragmented law too often fail to see how
hybrid categories of contract on the margins can be sluiceways of creep, allowing
law designed for one context with one values matrix to drift into an area of law
with another.
B. PORTABILITY

Scholars have long acknowledged that the significance of contract terms can
depend in part on the transactional context in which the terms are read.184
However, features of contract drafting and enabling technologies potentially liberate terms from their defining contexts, serving as another mechanism of creep.
Indeed, scholars have begun to appreciate a feature of contract drafting that facilitates context independence of certain terms. To wit, the use of self-contained
terms or sections that are portable among different transactional contexts—a process made even more common through the use of modern technologies—makes
these provisions less susceptible to the complications of context-dependent meaning.185 Technologies of both research and drafting—freed from the contextual
trappings of physical documents, treatises, or libraries—enable judges, clerks,
and lawyers to find, borrow, and import terms independent of contextual markers.
Modular design—by which a system is segmented into components “in which
communications (or other interdependencies) are intense within the module but
sparse and standardized across” them—enables the management of complexity.186 It does so by reducing the degree to which a part interacts with the
whole.187 Typically, contract drafting reflects some degree of modularity.
Contracts are often constituted by relatively self-contained sections that can be
revised, cut, or pasted without necessitating the rewriting of the entire document.
A high degree of modularity can promote efficient drafting, negotiation, and compliance and can reduce contracting and reading costs.188 As a result, modular
design has been identified as a promising technique for contract innovation.189 At
184. See Gilson et al., supra note 2, at 23 (identifying appropriate interpretive regimes based on a
“typology of transactional settings”).
185. See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1175, 1207 (2006) (“As long as the interface conditions are obeyed, one need not worry further
about the context.”).
186. Id. at 1176, 1180.
187. See id. at 1180–86.
188. See id. at 1184–85; see also Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking
in Complex Mergers and Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403, 1420 (2016) (discussing the efficiencies
of modular design through the use of ancillary contracts in complex deals).
189. See, e.g., George G. Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology, and
Innovation in Contract Design, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 177, 202–06 (2013) (advocating modularity
as an innovative contract design).
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the same time, the increased context independence and portability of terms
among transaction types enabled by more modular design also operates as a
mechanism for creep. Modularity seems to invite and enable courts to treat like
terms alike even when different transaction types might be better served by differential interpretation and application.
In particular, Henry Smith identifies as modular those provisions “typically . . .
found at the end of a contract” that address common issues “like assignment and
delegation, successors and assigns, third-party beneficiaries, governing law and
forum selection, waiver of jury trial, arbitration, remedies, indemnities, force
majeure, transaction costs, confidentiality, announcements and notices, amendment and waiver, severability, merger, and captions.”190 Encapsulated in separate
sections, these conventional contractual provisions prove particularly portable
across transaction types.191
The portability of these boilerplate provisions is apparent in their ubiquity.192
Yet, notwithstanding the way they can be incorporated easily into a range of
transactions, as discussed in Part II, ancillary contract terms, such as forum selection and arbitration provisions, do not have the same valence across contract
types. Instead, empirical and behavioral studies suggest that the extent to which
these ancillary terms reflect parties’ understanding, or are at all visible to parties,
differs depending on the party and transaction type.193 Thus, for example, forum
selection, arbitration, governing law, waiver of jury trial, and similar ancillary
provisions that modify the framework for litigation and redress prove less salient
for most individual consumers than they do for drafting companies or multinational corporate entities.194 This suggests that, notwithstanding the efficiency of
190. Smith, supra note 185, at 1191. Smith views these “boilerplate” terms as operating between the
poles of bespoke contract terms and standardized property rights, as relatively discrete contextindependent communication. See id. at 1176.
191. See id. at 1197 (noting that commonplace recurring provisions are often “hived off into
sections,” facilitating their portability and migration to different contexts). As Smith suggests using the
example of a governing law provision:
A boilerplate provision about governing law can be developed by those versed in choice of
law without their having to know in detail about where the boilerplate provision will wind
up—and without users of the boilerplate provision having to think through all of the possible
scenarios involving choice of law.
Id. at 1188.
192. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and Unilateral Amendments, 57
UCLA L. REV. 605, 607 (2010) (“Studies find mandatory arbitration clauses and class arbitration
waivers in over three-quarters of consumer agreements.”); Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 58, at 1639–
41 (acknowledging the prevalence of mandatory arbitration provisions); cf. Peter B. Rutledge &
Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses After
Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955 (2014) (explaining the slower-than-expected adoption of
favorable-to-drafter arbitration provisions in standard consumer contracts in part as a result of the
“stickiness” of standard form contracts).
193. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 63, at 258; Korobkin, supra note 64, at 1225–27; see also
Sternlight, Creeping, supra note 58, at 1648 (“Empirical studies have shown that only a minute
percentage of consumers read form agreements, and of these, only a smaller number understand what
they read.”).
194. See Korobkin, supra note 64, at 1230–31; see supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text.
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portability across different transactions, it would be too quick for interpreters to
assume the provisions should mean the same thing across transaction type. Yet
portability encourages this very effect.
A fractured theory of contracts acknowledges that arbitration provisions in a
negotiated agreement between transnational corporations, for example, reflect
qualitatively different processes of assessment and agreement than the same provision in a consumer contract.195 However, lacking contextual markers, or specific “interfaces” that demonstrate a transaction-specific operation,196 highly
modular provisions are often deemed to operate consistently across transactional
contexts.197 The standardized treatment by courts of such ancillary provisions—
once deemed presumptively unenforceable as against public policy in certain
contexts198—demonstrates the challenge they pose for a fragmented framework
of contract. The presence of similar terms, such as a forum selection clause, in
distinct transactional contexts enables the possibility of creep, or the application
of the same interpretive or doctrinal framework across transaction types.
Thus, the relatively modular nature of contractual drafting and the related portability of terms—increasingly facilitated by new technologies that enable quick
drafting without a subtle sense of context sensitivity—operate to create conditions for creep. Although a well-differentiated fragmented contract law would
carefully train drafters to develop transaction-type-specific operation of terms,
widespread modularity and portability will still create some difficulty for courts
as they face identical terms in different transactional environments. Moreover,
technologies of legal research, like those enabling a wide search for models,
allow contextual frames to recede, further inviting courts, consciously or
unknowingly, to appropriate doctrinal approaches from different transactional
contexts. In short, contract drafting processes lend themselves to the implementation of modular design, and thus the creation of relatively context-independent
provisions, which in turn enable creep.
195. See, e.g., Gilson et al., supra note 2, at 76 (noting that “commercial and consumer contracts . . .
should be interpreted differently” when considering interpretive approaches to ancillary terms).
196. See Smith, supra note 185, at 1207 (“As long as the interface conditions are obeyed, one need
not worry further about the context.”). These interfaces could take the form of doctrinal tracks but, as
discussed above, in contract law, those tracks may prove unstable. Interfaces could also conceivably be
manifested as a term. See Klass, supra note 35, at 17–18 (discussing the benefits of a “short canonical
form” indicating the parties’ intent to form an integrated agreement, for example, along the lines of
other canonical formulas such as “F.O.B.” or “as is”). Depending on the particularities of both the text
and context, these terms might themselves be susceptible to migration across transaction types and thus
creep, as discussed in this Part.
197. See supra Part II.
198. For the presumption against forum selection provisions, see Carbon Black Exp., Inc. v. The
Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300–01 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180 (1959), which discusses
the “universally accepted rule that agreements in advance of controversy whose object is to oust the
jurisdiction of the courts are contrary to public policy and will not be enforced.” Prior to the enactment
of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925, arbitration provisions had limited impact in practice. See
9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012). At the time of enactment, the effective unenforceability of arbitration provisions in
transactions between merchants under the common law was considered anachronistic. See S. REP. NO.
68-536, at 2 (1924).

2019]

CONTRACT CREEP

1313

C. ANALOGICAL REASONING

In addition to the difficulty of maintaining stable categories of transaction
types and the relatively modular structure of contract drafting, the predominant
mode of legal reasoning by courts—the use of analogical reasoning—operates as
another technology of creep. Discussing the challenges of legal classification in a
now canonical article, Arthur Leff noted that because “there is no such thing as a
thoroughly homogenous class . . . [a]ll classification decisions are . . . choices
among metaphors.”199 As a fundamental feature of common law analysis, the process of reasoning by analogy and the mobilization of metaphor in classifying
transactions also contributes to creep. As Leff identified, one danger of classification as an intellectual tool is the “problem of artificial class homogenization” in
which certain functional differences are ignored.200 At the same time, the heterogeneity of any class demonstrates the potential porousness of boundaries. Indeed,
the recognition that courts reason analogically across transaction types is at the
heart of Scott and Schwartz’s line-drawing project and insight that different transaction types should precipitate distinct doctrinal regimes.
As an illustration, the requirement that a party be notified of the existence of a
term has become a doctrinal threshold in the enforcement of common ancillary
provisions, such as forum selection and arbitration clauses.201 Yet this notice
requirement can be understood to have crept from sophisticated party to consumer contexts not only through a mixing and hybridizing of transaction type as
we saw above, but also through metaphor and analogical reasoning.
Consider a particularly developed explanatory metaphor that courts have been
using to reinforce the importance of notice for ancillary terms.202 The metaphor
first arose in a case about a transaction involving two business entities engaged in
repeated exchanges. Verio, a website development firm, submitted requests for
domain name registrant data to Register.com, an internet domain name registrar.203 Each purchase of data was followed by a notice of “terms of use” relayed
to the purchaser via email.204 Assessing the second transaction in the series of
exchanges in light of a claim that Verio violated the terms, Second Circuit Court
of Appeals Judge Pierre Leval rejected the contention that Verio had failed to
receive notice of terms so as to be bound.205 To explain the point, he offered the
following analogy:

199. Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 132–33 (1970).
200. Id. at 136.
201. See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
202. For an analysis of the significance of party types in light of the party’s status as a “repeat player”
or “one-shotter,” see Galanter, supra note 164, at 97–104.
203. Register.com v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 401 (2d Cir. 2004).
204. Id. at 396.
205. Id. at 402. For a discussion of this case in connection with courts’ invocation of a narrative of
agreement, which muddies the distinction between the operation of different types of terms in different
contexts, see Tal Kastner, How ‘Bout Them Apples?: The Power of Stories of Agreement in Consumer
Contracts, 7 DREXEL L. REV. 67, 104–10 (2014).
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The situation might be compared to one in which plaintiff P maintains a roadside fruit stand displaying bins of apples. A visitor, defendant D, takes an apple
and bites into it. As D turns to leave, D sees a sign, visible only as one turns to
exit, which says “Apples—50 cents apiece.” D does not pay for the apple. D
believes he has no obligation to pay because he had no notice when he bit into
the apple that 50 cents was expected in return. D’s view is that he never agreed
to pay for the apple. Thereafter, each day, several times a day, D revisits the
stand, takes an apple, and eats it. D never leaves money.206

Judge Leval explains the legal outcome in terms of “standard contract doctrine:”207 “when a benefit is offered subject to stated conditions, and the offeree
makes a decision to take the benefit with knowledge of the terms of the offer, the
taking constitutes an acceptance of the terms.”208 Thus, if “P sues D in contract
for the price of the apples taken,” notwithstanding the possibility of prevailing on
the initial apple, D’s defense that he did not see the notice of the price until after
taking the apple the first time fails for the second apple.209
In the context of a merchant-to-merchant transaction, the Second Circuit
asserted that “[w]hile new commerce on the Internet has exposed courts to many
new situations, it has not fundamentally changed the principles of contract.”210
The court rejected the purchaser’s argument that an online agreement must
require an affirmative indication of assent to terms, recognizing the business-tobusiness context of the transaction.211
Yet this doctrinal pronouncement, along with the metaphor, creeps by way of
analogy into the realm of consumer contracting. In contrast to the transaction
addressed by Judge Leval involving two merchants, the metaphor of the sign
above the apple stand grounds a later district court’s explanation of why a consumer had adequate notice of terms of use.212 Analogizing the apple stand to a
case involving a forum selection clause embedded in Facebook’s Terms of
Use,213 a district court expanded the metaphor so as to blur the distinction in
transaction type. Explaining its holding enforcing a forum selection clause, the
district court compared “[t]he situation . . . to one in which Facebook maintains a
roadside fruit stand displaying bins of apples. For purposes of this case, suppose
that above the bins of apples are signs that say, ‘By picking up this apple, you
consent to the terms of sales by this fruit stand. For those terms, turn over this
sign.’”214 Thus, the expanded analogy of the fruit stand erases the distinction

206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

Register.com, 356 F.3d at 401.
Id. at 403.
Id.
Id. at 401.
Id. at 403.
Id.
See Fteja v. Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 839 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Id.
Id. (internal citations omitted).

2019]

CONTRACT CREEP

1315

between product terms in a merchant-to-merchant context and ancillary provisions in a consumer contract.215 This case, Fteja, conjuring the category of sophisticated internet user, should be familiar by now: analogical reasoning works
together with the fluidity of transaction types to facilitate creep there.
Indeed, the expanded analogy serves to underscore the doctrinal formality of
the notice requirement in subsequent applications of the rule in the consumer context. In validating an arbitration clause in the Uber terms of use, one court reiterated the analogy, reinforcing the way creep works through analogical reasoning.
The court explained in Cullinane v. Uber Techs., “[i]n analyzing online agreements, the Second Circuit has used the analogy of a roadside fruit stand displaying bins of apples; these apples have a sign above them displaying the price of the
apples for potential consumers.”216 The court notes its agreement with the way
this analogy has been “refined . . . further” to encompass the “terms of sales” on
the back of the metaphoric sign.217
Thus, as the metaphor evolves to include a back-of-the-sign notice of ancillary
terms to a consumer in place of a pricing or product term in the context of a sophisticated party transaction, it demonstrates the problem of “artificial class homogenization” to which Leff referred.218 As such, notwithstanding the contextual distinctions
among the cases—Verio is business-to-business; Fteja is sophisticated-consumerto-business; and Cullinane is a plain-vanilla consumer transaction—the doctrinal
approach to notice resists cabining by transaction type in part because of the ineluctable appeal of the apple stand analogy. The tendency for creep to occur as a function of the migration of metaphor proves unsurprising, especially in a common law
regime where reasoning by analogy is a foundational tool. But sometimes it is worth
policing analogies—as Scott and Schwartz’s project in principle suggests we do—
so deliberately fragmented regimes don’t get too quickly and inappropriately
assimilated.
Creep happens through at least the three mechanisms we identify here: the fluidity of party status and transaction type; the portability of contract provisions;
and the analogies that migrate among cases of different transaction types.
Moreover, there are no doubt ways these mechanisms work not only alone but
also in tandem with one another, colluding to make creep even more likely. We
conclude in Part IV by drawing out a few lessons from contract creep. We do not
think there are perfect solutions to some of the complexities of creep that fragmentation invites. However, more mindfulness and more deliberate effort to take
stock of the dynamics of creep is warranted.

215. See supra Part II for scholars’ identification of the ways ancillary terms differ from price and
product terms and ways in which the individual consumer’s ability to assess such terms may differ from
that of a merchant.
216. Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750-DPW, 2016 WL 3751652, at *7 (D. Mass.
July 11, 2016) (emphasis added) (citing Register.com, 356 F.3d at 401).
217. Id. (citing Fteja, 841 F. Supp. at 839–40).
218. Leff, supra note 199, at 136.
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IV. LESSONS FROM CREEP
Having now identified a phenomenon that many scholars who promote fragmentation avoid confronting—and having observed a few of the mechanisms in
the common law of contract and contract drafting practices that contribute to
creep—we conclude by summarizing our analysis and outlining its relevance for
lawmakers, contract lawyers, and theorists.
A. RECOGNIZING CREEP AND ITS COSTS

Appreciating the porousness of transaction types and the way doctrines creep
among them enables us to intervene in a robust conversation among contract theorists who wish to sustain plural objectives with plural contract law regimes. Our
caution here that these regimes do not necessarily stay cordoned off from one
another commits us neither to advocate for a unitary contract theory nor to reject
the project of fragmentation. Indeed, we cannot contest that terms are agreed to
differently in different transactional contexts, which may justify distinct doctrinal
approaches and default rules. The tracked application of the parol evidence rule
implicitly demonstrates courts’ intuitions concerning the need for a fragmented
approach. More explicitly, scholars emphasize the need for a fragmented regime,
whether in isolating a “sophisticated party” contract law or in a pursuit of proliferations of categories of contract types. Both legal thinkers and courts thereby
recognize that distinctions among parties’ sophistication, capacities, resources,
and bargaining power impact and should impact the shaping of default rules and
interpretive approaches.
Yet the likelihood of creep directly implicates the project of creating bespoke
doctrine for different transaction types. A rich field of study is dedicated to the development of an optimal merchant law. For example, Schwartz and Scott,
Goldberg, and others219 embrace this project, grounded in the notion that an efficient framework—one attuned to the dynamic of transactions among “sophisticated economic actors”220—should apply to sophisticated parties. Our work here
has shown, however, that this project at least must take more seriously the question of how to delineate the boundaries of the legal regime because there is a high
likelihood that the optimal merchant law will bleed out and affect consumer
transactions. To develop a program that defaults toward party preferences—a
merchant law to “recover and then enforce the parties’ apparent intentions”221—
scholars must give further thought to the ways in which transaction-type boundaries can be stabilized and better delimited.
Creep also poses a real challenge to the project of increasing the choices
among distinct transactional realms. The goal of realizing autonomy through a
proliferation of contract types that Dagan and Heller envision necessitates a

219. See GOLDBERG, supra note 22, at 1; Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 544–45.
220. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 544–45.
221. See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial
Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (2017).
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mitigation plan for creep. The cultivation of wide-ranging contract types to enable freedom of contract requires further study of the mechanisms that disrupt
transaction-type boundaries. Most basically, creep introduces a cost that must be
reckoned with in advancing a multiplicity of contract types. In addition, without
addressing the operation of creep, projects such as Dagan and Heller’s may be
doomed to undermine their own agenda because of creep’s power and robustness.
In connection with other areas of law, such as property, scholars have identified
“a limited number of standardized forms” of ownership.222 In doing so, scholars
distinguish property law from the realm of contract in which “there is a potentially infinite range of promises that the law will honor.”223 The phenomenon of
creep suggests that further consideration is warranted as to whether there may be
an “optimal standardization” of contract rights—and with it forms of contract.224
With a shorter list, it might be easier to manage creep within the contract system.
At the very least, creep introduces a cost that must be weighed in the calculus.
Even if theory moves away from the proliferation of transaction type urged by
the Dagan and Heller model, but tries instead to stick with just the sophisticated
party category, there remains yet another challenge for theory. In defending the
attention they give to a specialized regime for sophisticated parties, Schwartz and
Scott assert that “as a descriptive matter, most commercial contracts affect only
the parties to them.”225 Yet in light of what we now know about creep, the doctrines we make for sophisticated parties may still creep away from them and
affect consumers, too. As such, a tracked approach to contract doctrine may need
to reconsider disregarding interests of fairness and distribution in the development of a sophisticated party contract regime that can leak elsewhere.226
The more recent work of Ronald Gilson, Charles Sabel, and Robert Scott
acknowledges that “[t]he range of options for parties and generalist courts is
much more diverse and variegated than the choice between ex ante party
autonomy and ex post adjudication.”227 This work appreciates that complexity
rather than prefab tracking is likely essential to getting interpretive questions
right. As their analysis suggests, and our case studies do not contradict, “generalist judges applying general, mandatory legal doctrine cannot effectively determine the environments in which context matters.”228 Yet, to the extent that their
analysis still requires bespoke legal doctrine to guide judges, our case studies
222. Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The
Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L. J. 1, 8 (2000).
223. Id. at 3.
224. Cf. id. at 38–40 (discussing an optimal level of standardization in property rights); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem
and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 380 (2002) (“[T]he utility of standard contractual
terms and forms is evidently not frustrated by the continuing availability of an infinite variety of
nonstandard contractual rights with unconventional and perhaps hard-to-measure characteristics.”).
225. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 2, at 555.
226. Cf. id. at 545 (noting that requiring the law to “promote fairness in contracting” would “be
troublesome for an efficiency approach that covered all contract types”).
227. Gilson et al., supra note 2, at 23.
228. Id. at 32.
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suggest that they should not be so sanguine that such a goal is attainable without
creep—and without the costs of creep resulting from the imposition of ill-fitting
law to some transaction types.
In short, the now widely shared insight that it would be desirable to have separate contract regimes for sophisticated parties on the one hand and consumers on
the other has an Achilles heel. Contract law and contract theory to date have
failed to examine with sufficient care the ways that different tracks and fragmented regimes are susceptible to interaction effects. To design a tracked system
properly, theorists and courts must first acknowledge the porous and unstable nature of the tracks themselves, focusing as we have here on just how the lines get
crossed. Creep—the migration of transaction-specific doctrine across transaction
types—is a counterforce that will challenge efforts at fragmentation.
B. RISKS AND COSTS OF STANDARDIZATION AND PORTABILITY

Creep also complicates the existing cost–benefit analysis of modes of contract
drafting and design. It is, in the final analysis, not just doctrine and theory that
will have to contend with the risks and costs associated with creep but contract
drafters and lawyers as well.
Drafters routinely employ standardized terms and relatively modular design.
The benefits of standardization and modularity for contract design have long
been recognized. For example, standardized terms impart value through learning
benefits and related network effects.229 The learning benefits that result from
standardization or common usage of terms include drafting efficiency, lawyers’
and other professionals’ familiarity with the terms, and less uncertainty about a
term’s meaning in light of judicial precedent.230 Network benefits emerge as
more parties use the same term or product.231 Like the use of a term over time, the
widespread use of a term raises the quality and lowers the costs of legal and professional services, aids in the pricing of securities, and aids in the development of
interpretive precedent.232 In addition, modular design is a promising technique
for contract innovation because innovators can develop and improve a provision
without having to modify other terms.233 Innovations, or significant improvements to contracts beyond customization, can also be imported to other documents and become standardized themselves.234
The portability of terms may, however, lead to costs because of creep. As we
explained in Part III, the relatively modular design of contract documents and the
process of drafting by pasting or modifying precedent, which facilitated and is
229. See generally Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate
Contracting (or “The Economics of Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713 (1997) (analyzing benefits that
accrue as a result of standardization of terms). A classic example of a product with network benefits is
the telephone.
230. Id. at 719–20.
231. Id. at 726.
232. Id.
233. Triantis, supra note 189, at 182.
234. Id. at 184.
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facilitated by standardization of terms, contribute to the problem of doctrinal
regimes being applied to transaction types for which they were not designed.
Furthering this process, the current technological environment supports the dissemination of terms. Internet technology has not only enabled broad sharing of
terms, but has also “encouraged the recent formation of broadly constituted
groups dedicated to setting contracting standards across, as well as within, industries.”235 Innovative deal structures will also draw on existing forms of both transacting and documentation. Word-search based technologies further invite
importation of terms and doctrine from one context to another. Conditions are
thus ripe for the migration of terms across transaction types, which itself is likely
to lead to ever more creep. An analysis of the benefits of standardization and
of the design of portable terms must therefore also weigh the risks and costs of
doctrinal creep that they enable and cause.
Scholars have acknowledged some of the potential costs of standardization.
For one, theorists have noted the “stickiness,” or tendency of standardized terms
to resist change, as a potential obstacle to efficiency in contract drafting and innovation.236 Standardization has also been shown to lead at times to “rote usage,” or
the loss of shared meaning through overuse, as well as “encrustation,” or the erosion of the intelligibility of a standard term as a result of the addition of legal jargon over time.237 However, work has yet to be done on how creep, and the way
standardization and modularity enable it, compounds the risks posed by the phenomena of stickiness, rote usage, and encrustation.
One set of legal developments that has prompted a wealth of scholarly discussion238 illustrates the costs of creep in a way that has not yet been
acknowledged directly. Specifically, the idiosyncratic—and by all accounts,
mistaken—interpretation by courts of the meaning of a boilerplate provision in
the sovereign debt context demonstrates the interplay of creep, portability, and
standardization. In the past few years, courts in Brussels and New York repeatedly interpreted a ubiquitous provision, the pari passu clause, to provide special

235. Id. at 188.
236. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 651, 651–52 (2006). Scholars have also identified the phenomenon of “stickiness” of default rules
as a function of the difficulty of contracting around a term. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An
Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J. 2032, 2086 (2012). This type of stickiness is at play
in the case study of contra proferentem discussed in Part II, in which sophisticated parties cannot
necessarily easily contract out of the default rule.
237. Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 221, at 5.
238. The developments concerning the pari passu clause in sovereign debt have prompted a host of
theoretical, empirical, and practical scholarship on contract design. See, e.g., MITU GULATI & ROBERT
E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION: BOILERPLATE AND THE LIMITS OF CONTRACT
DESIGN (2013); Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Restructuring Sovereign Debt After NML v.
Argentina, 12 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 224, 224–38 (2017); Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 221, at 6; Stephen
J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, Variation in Boilerplate: Rational Design or Random Mutation,
20 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 2 (2018); Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths,
Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 72, 72 (2013).
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rights to holdout creditors of sovereign debt.239 They did so despite the fact that it
was widely accepted that the clause had no operative meaning for sophisticated
sovereign creditors.240 Indeed, prior to the decisions, the conventional wisdom
among sophisticated investors was that their contracts did not give them a holdout
right (to say nothing of the debt purchasers in the distressed secondary market).241
The resulting costs of the mistaken interpretation—most notably, the triggering
of the Republic of Argentina’s default on $29 billion of debt242—resulted, in part,
from the interplay between creep and standardized terms that migrated across
transaction type.
The pari passu provision, after all, entered the sovereign debt contract by
“migrat[ing] from cross-border corporate documents” and being “copied by . . .
lawyers . . . who had not realized that such a clause was meaningless in the sovereign context.”243 The “black hole” of meaning that resulted from the inclusion of a standard provision provided the opportunity for exploitation by a
“contractual arbitrageur.”244 Specifically, a holdout creditor took “advantage
of a long-standing canon of contract construction,” the general contract presumption that all clauses have meaning.245 The creditor thereby leveraged and
weaponized the possibilities for creep—a generalist contract doctrine in a particular transaction type—to invite an unintended interpretation. Thus, in addition to the danger of portability in its own right, the possibility of doctrinal
creep exacerbates the risks of the relocation of standard terms.
Standardized terms in homogenously sophisticated markets invite a particular
doctrinal approach that recognizes the efficiency of communicating fixed and
reliable meaning.246 In the case of pari passu in the sovereign debt context, however, courts implemented a generalist interpretive approach. Specifically, the
239. See Joint Appendix at A-1356, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d
Cir. 2012) (No. 12-105(L)) for an English translation of the Brussels case first interpreting the pari passu
clause in a Peruvian sovereign debt contract. See also Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 238, at 6 n.11
(citing Joint Appendix, supra, at A-1356). For decisions affirming the same interpretation in a case
against the Republic of Argentina, see NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 727 F.3d 230 (2d
Cir. 2013); NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246 (2d. Cir. 2012); NML Capital,
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08-Civ.-6978(TPG), 2011 WL 9522565 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011). See
generally GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 238.
240. For a discussion of the recent interpretation of the pari passu provision in connection with first
debt issued by the Republic of Peru and then by the Republic of Argentina, see Choi, Gulati & Scott,
supra note 221, at 18–24. See also GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 238, at 3, 51–52, 109–18 (discussing a
lack of understanding of the meaning of the term by sovereign bond market participants).
241. See id.
242. Kathy Gilsinan, 65 Words Just Caused Argentina’s $29-Billion Default, ATLANTIC (July 31,
2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/07/65-words-just-caused-argentinas-29billion-default/375368/ [https://perma.cc/P6BN-PSWN].
243. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 238, at 14 (citing Lee C. Buchheit, Negative Pledge Clauses: The
Games People Play, 9 INT’L FIN. L. REV. 10, 10 (1990)); see also Lee C. Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam,
The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53 EMORY L.J. 869, 875 (2004).
244. Choi et al., supra note 221, at 72.
245. GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 238, at 14.
246. See Sharon Steel Corp. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 691 F.2d 1039, 1048 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1012 (1983) (explaining interpretive approach to “[b]oilerplate provisions,” in
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courts treated the contract language as indicative of the intent of the particular
parties thereto. In doing so, they failed to apply the parties’ ex ante preferred interpretive framework, in which boilerplate is read to reflect the shared understanding of the market as a whole—another example of creep. Whereas the creep
in this case may be viewed as one within the broad realm of sophisticated party
transactions, it nonetheless illustrates the challenge of maintaining discrete tracks
and bespoke doctrine, even when there is a significant degree of consensus in the
markets and among scholars.
As the pari passu cases illustrate, even in distinctive transaction markets, generalist courts and sophisticated parties remain vulnerable to creep. In addition,
theoretical models of sophisticated party contracting have suggested that parties
will revise terms to correct for mistaken interpretations.247 However, the case
study of pari passu presents an example of the slow workings of the market to
correct the court error—a “systemic problem that caused substantial costs.”248
Evidence that the market may be slow to correct the mistake by courts as well as
the identification of “black hole” terms in various standard markets,249 demonstrates further potential costs of creep. The risk of creep must therefore also be
included in evaluating the costs and benefits of the use of standardized terms in
contract design.
CONCLUSION
In Duncan Kennedy’s famous article Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, he identified two central dynamic forces that he thought would
always make claims on contract law and shape it: individualism and altruism.250
Although he argued that these are opposed to one another and have contradictory
implications for regime design in contract law, he argued that people tend to be
unable to rid themselves fully of either tendency. This leads to instability, indeterminacy, occasional incoherence, and tension within the law of contract. It may
be that the urges of fragmentation and harmonization—like individualism and
altruism—also form an ineluctable dialectic. Both forces have pull on us when
we are faced with complexity. We all hold both instincts at once: we want both
more specific contract types and more generality in our contract law at the same
time. Creep may be the way we mediate between them, as we lay down tracks for
particularized contexts, only to see law developed in one track find itself relevant
and harmonized for another.

light of view that they are “not the consequence of the relationship of particular borrowers and lenders
and do not depend upon particularized intentions of the parties to an indenture”).
247. See GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 238, at 5.
248. Choi, Gulati & Scott, supra note 221, at 2.
249. See id. at 71 (pointing to the “number of recent papers exploring similar problems in other
standard markets”).
250. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685,
1685 (1976).
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Yet for those who advocate for different forms of fragmentation and particularity in contract law, it seems high time to pay more careful attention to the
way creep tends to leave specialized law susceptible to affecting law well outside it—and susceptible to being made impure from outside. Something less
than purity might need to be the goal considering the reality of creep. That
means lawmakers, lawyers, and theorists have to account for the risks and the
costs of creep as they design their modalities of fragmentation in our increasingly complex economy. Further study will hopefully reveal how best to design
regimes of contract that both have structural integrity and develop through
analogy only when appropriate.

